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INTRODUCTION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE U.S. PATENT 
SYSTEM 
 
Megan M. La Belle+ 
For more than a decade now, the topics of innovation policy and patent reform 
have been priorities among U.S. lawmakers.  In the early 2000s, the conversation 
focused on concerns about our patent system impeding innovation because it 
was “too strong.”1  Innovators, particularly in the high-tech industry, claimed 
that non-practicing entities or “trolls” were using junk patents to force operating 
companies into nuisance settlements by threatening infringement suits and 
permanent injunctions.2  These threats distracted companies like Google and 
Facebook from what they should be focused on—namely, the creation and 
development of beneficial consumer products and services—or so the story 
went.  Consequently, in September 2011, Congress passed the America Invents 
Act (AIA), a comprehensive law that overhauled the U.S. patent system.3 
Since the AIA became effective in 2012, it has been easier to invalidate 
patents.4  This is due, in large part, to the creation of new administrative 
proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), particularly inter 
partes review . These post-grant proceedings allow patents to be invalidated in 
a quicker and cheaper manner than pre-AIA, when patents were primarily 
challenged in federal court.5  In addition to the changes wrought by the AIA, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has issued key decisions regarding patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 that arguably have undermined the strength of the U.S. 
patent system.6 
Earlier this year, the International IP Commercialization Council (IIPCC) 
hosted a conference titled Meeting the Challenges to America’s Economic 
Future: Charting the Course in U.S. Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy 
that explored these topics.  As the conference transcripts published herein 
reflect, many stakeholders are worried that our innovation ecosystem is at risk 
                                               
+ Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad  
Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 12. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.). 
 4. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Amwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 100–01 (2014) (discussing how many patent claims 
have been successfully challenged through post-grant review proceedings at PTO). 
 5. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 653 (2012) (explaining that Congress created post-grant review 
proceedings to provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to litigation). 
 6. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 537 U.S. 208, 221 (2014). 
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because the pendulum has swung too far against the protection of patent rights.7  
Yet, others believe that the AIA is operating exactly how Congress intended and 
is creating a more balanced patent system that facilitates and encourages 
innovation.8  With various legislative proposals introduced over the past few 
years—including the Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth 
and Economic Resilience (STRONGER) Patents Act9 and the Targeting Rogue 
and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act10—Congress will have to decide what reforms 
to our patent system, if any, are necessary to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”11 
I. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM OF THE PAST 
The patent system in the U.S. is as old as the nation itself.12  Over the past two 
centuries, the country has experienced periods of stronger and weaker patent 
protection. The 1970s, for example, was a “low water mark” for patent rights 
thus prompting Congress to create the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982.13  The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent cases, heralded a new era of protectionism for patent rights that persisted 
until the AIA was passed in 2011. 
For the first two decades after its creation, the Federal Circuit consistently 
issued decisions favoring patent owners thereby establishing the U.S. as a 
stronghold of patent protection.  Without cataloguing each of these decisions, a 
few key ones are worth mentioning.  Early on, in Smith International, Inc. v. 
Hughes Tool Co.,14 the Federal Circuit announced a rule for near automatic 
injunctions upon a finding of patent infringement.15  As a result, patent owners 
were armed with a powerful bargaining tool (i.e., the threat of a permanent 
injunction) that could be used to secure license fees and settlements.16  What is 
more, just two years after its creation, the Federal Circuit made it much more 
difficult to invalidate patents on obviousness grounds by adopting the “teaching-
                                               
 7. See infra. 
 8. Id. (discussing arguments’ of AIA supporters). 
 9. Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience 
(STRONGER) Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 10. Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act, H.R. 6370, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 
2045, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. Id.; Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790). 
 13. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 14. 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 15. Id. at 1581 (“A court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so 
clearly established his patent rights.  We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have 
been clearly established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed.”). 
 16. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that patentees can employ injunctions ”as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant [licensing] fees”). 
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suggestion-motivation” test.17  The court also expanded the scope of § 101, most 
notably in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group18 where 
it decided that business methods were patentable subject matter.  This led to a 
significant increase in the number—and many believe a decrease in the 
quality—of patents granted by the PTO each year.19  Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, the Federal Circuit ensured its position as the primary policymaker 
in the patent arena when it held that the PTO lacked substantive rulemaking 
authority and refused to afford deference to the agency’s legal determinations.20 
These and other Federal Circuit decisions created an environment ripe for 
abuse.  With the more relaxed standards for obviousness and subject matter 
eligibility, the number of patent applications filed, as well as patents ultimately 
granted by the PTO, rapidly increased.21  During this time, the PTO was severely 
under-resourced and patents were mistakenly granted.22  Rather than 
commercializing those inventions, however, “bad” patents were often sold to 
entities that enforce patents through licensing and litigation, but don’t practice 
them.23  These entities—alternatively referred to as patent enforcement entities 
(PAEs), non-practicing entities, and trolls—posed serious “holdup” problems 
for operating companies, particularly in the high tech sector.24  The PAE 
business model, in essence, was to acquire low-value patents, and then demand 
that accused infringers take a license or face an infringement suit and a 
permanent injunction.25  Because injunctions were virtually guaranteed under 
Federal Circuit law and patent suits were time-consuming, unpredictable, and 
expensive to defend, accused infringers often capitulated to PAEs and took 
licenses or settled.26 
                                               
 17. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp. 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce 
the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination.”). 
 18. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business 
Method Patents, 16 U. PENN. J. BUS. LAW 431, 448–50 (2014). 
 20. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 21. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015 
(last modified Dec. 14, 2018), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (reflecting a significant jump in the 
number of patents issued in the late 1990s after State Street was decided). 
 22. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008). 
 23. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012). 
 24. Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement 
Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 931 (2009) (defining patent holdup as “the opportunistic use of 
patent rights to extract above-benchmark compensation”). 
 25. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 
401 (2014). 
 26. Id. 
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This patent holdup problem spurred a call for reform.27  Beginning in 2005, 
various bills were introduced in Congress to overhaul the patent system, but they 
died in committee.28  Legislative reform efforts intensified the following year, 
and ultimately culminated in Congress enacting the AIA on September 16, 
2011.29  To be sure, the impact of the AIA has been significant, as discussed 
below.  Yet, even before the landmark legislation passed, the courts were 
effecting major change in patent doctrine.  Specifically, the Supreme Court made 
it harder for patent owners to defend against declaratory judgment actions30 and 
get permanent injunctions,31 and made it easier for accused infringers to prove 
that patented inventions were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 10332 or lacked proper 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.33  Thus, by the time the AIA went into 
effect in 2012, the U.S. patent system already looked markedly different than it 
had just a decade before. 
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
The AIA, the most comprehensive patent reform legislation since 1952, 
fundamentally altered the way patents are issued and litigated in this country.  
For starters, it switched our priority system from “first-to-invent” to “first-to-
file,” bringing the U.S. more in harmony with the rest of the world.34  The new 
law also expanded the definition of prior art to include public disclosures outside 
the U.S.,35 created a new defense to patent infringement of prior commercial 
use,36 and gave the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) greater 
control over its fees.37  Arguably more significant than any of these changes, 
however, was the AIA’s creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) 
and various administrative proceedings for challenging patent validity ex post, 
                                               
 27. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2014). 
 28. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 439 (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (rejecting “the 
Federal Circuit’s ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test,” and thus making it easier for alleged 
infringers to challenge patents via declaratory relief). 
 31. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (rejecting the Federal 
Circuit’s “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement”). 
 32. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for obviousness should be flexibly applied, not 
as “rigid and mandatory formulas”). 
 33. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 34. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a), 125 Stat. 284–341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.). 
 35. Id. § 3(b). 
 36. Id. § 5(a), § 273(a). 
 37. See, e.g., id. § 10(a) (allowing PTO to “set or adjust by rule any fee” for patent-related 
services or materials provided that any such change is used “to recover the aggregate estimated 
costs to the Office for processing, activities, services, and materials relating to patents”). 
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meaning after patents had already been granted.38  These new proceedings, 
which include inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered 
business method review (CBM), were supposed to simplify patent litigation by 
providing a quicker and less expensive means for invalidating bad patents.39  As 
one Federal Circuit judge explained it, “[t]he premise [was] that an adversarial 
evidentiary proceeding in the PTO [would] reliably resolve most issues of patent 
validity, without the expense and delay of district court litigation, and sometimes 
even before infringement has occurred.”40 
The PTAB opened its doors in September 2012, immediately went to work, 
and has kept busy ever since.  As of July 2018, a total of 8,874 post-grant 
petitions had been filed (8,190 IPRs, 557 CBMs, and 127 PGRs), far exceeding 
expectations about how attractive these proceedings would be to patent 
challengers.41  One reason these proceedings have been so popular is because of 
the early success that challengers enjoyed.  By way of example, a 2014 study 
showed that petitioners in IPRs were winning complete victories almost two-
thirds of the time when they pursued petitions to a final decision.42  These early 
statistics caused some, including the former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit 
Randall Rader—one of the speakers at the IIPCC conference43—to view the 
PTAB as a “death squad”44 and a “killing field”45 whose inclination to invalidate 
patents undermines our economy by discouraging investment in innovation and 
technology.46  What is more, critics have denounced the PTAB for complicating 
patent litigation rather than streamlining it, as Congress intended.47  Rader and 
                                               
 38. Id. §§ 6, 7, 18 at 299–316, 329–31. 
 39. See Matal, supra note 5, at 653. 
 40. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 41. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: 
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251 (2015) (“[T]hese statistics 
speak loudly about the public’s eagerness and ability to use these procedures to ‘weed out’ bad 
patents.”). 
 42. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101 (2014). 
 43. See infra at 627. 
 44. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are all Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-
squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/ (quoting the comments of former 
Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader made at the 2013 AIPLA annual meeting in Washington, 
D.C.). 
 45. Erich Spangenberg, Patent Predictions for 2015, IPNAV BLOG (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.ipnav.com/blog/erich-spangenbergs-patent-predictions-for-2015/. 
 46. See, e.g., A. Abbott, et al., Crippling the Innovation Economy: Regulatory Overreach at 
the Patent Office, REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-Group-
Paper.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, M.D., Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 883 (2015) 
(“[M]ore opportunities to challenge issued patents also means more opportunities to engage in 
abusive practices to undermine legitimate patent rights.”) 
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Paul Michel, also a former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, both addressed 
that point at the conference, claiming that PTAB proceedings complicate patent 
litigation—for example, by using different standards than courts for claim 
construction and burden of proof—thus driving up costs by a significant 
margin.48  Finally, detractors argue that the PTAB has failed to solve the patent 
troll problem, and instead has besieged operating companies, undermined the 
federal courts’ role in patent law, and hampered innovation in the U.S.49 
These critiques of the PTAB were explored in depth at the IIPCC conference.  
Speakers talked about how the increased risk of patent invalidation is 
discouraging research, development, and investment in innovation.  
Representatives from a cross-section of patent owners—the Cleveland Clinic, 
University of Michigan, IBM, Qualcomm, and Personalized Media 
Communications (PMC)—shared stories about how recent changes to the patent 
system are negatively impacting innovators “on the ground.”50  Aaric Eisenstein, 
Vice President of Licensing Strategy for PMC, explained how repeated PTAB 
challenges cause significant strain on innovators, especially the individual 
inventors his company serves.  More fundamentally, Eisenstein and others 
complain, the PTAB undermines the PTO’s primary mission: issuing patents.51 
Yet the stories shared at the IIPCC conference did not focus exclusively, or 
even primarily, on the PTAB.  Instead, much of the discussion was devoted to 
two other issues wholly unrelated to the AIA: patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 and permanent injunctions in patent cases.  As noted above, 
before Congress enacted the AIA, the Supreme Court undertook patent reform 
on its own by issuing a number of landmark decisions.52  In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court continued to tweak the patent system after the AIA, particularly 
with respect to § 101 in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,53 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
                                               
 48. See infra at 627 (“The PTAB, quite aside from invalidations, adds per challenge 
something in the order of $300 to $600 thousand dollars per challenge and there are often multiple 
challenges.”) (Michel, P.); id. (“In many instances, [PTAB review] has added to the expense and 
the time of the proceeding without any real concomitant benefit.”) (Rader, R.). 
 49. Id. (“[The PTAB] hasn’t even hit the main target it was supposed to hit, which is the patent 
troll case.”); id. at 628 (“[I]t seems to me the measure of accuracy and fairness—due process, if 
you will—in a PTAB should be by comparing it to what happens in a court of law.”) (Michel, P.); 
see also Abbott, supra note 46, at 4 (“The PTAB administrative tribunal is creating unnecessary 
costs for inventors and companies, and thus it is harming the innovation economy far beyond the 
harm of the bad patents it was created to remedy.”). 
 50. See infra at 634–645. 
 51. Id. at 639 (stating that the PTO “is directed to issuing valid patents.  That’s what it’s for.”); 
see also Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief 
Says, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-
squadlabelnot-totally-off-base-chief-says (quoting Randall Rader as saying that the PTO “was in 
tension with itself, with thousand[s] of examiners ‘giving birth’ to patents and hundreds of judges 
on the PTAB ‘acting as death squads, kind of killing property rights’”). 
 52. See supra notes 30–33. 
 53. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
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Inc.,54 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.55  This trilogy of cases 
reinvigorated the judicially-created exceptions to § 101—i.e., that laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patent 
protection—and attempted to set out a framework for determining when the 
exceptions apply.56  Specifically, the Alice test requires courts to ask, first, 
whether the claims at issue are directed to a “patent-ineligible concept,” meaning 
one of the judicially-created exceptions.57  If so, then is there an element or 
combination of elements in the claim that amounts to “significantly more than a 
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”?58  With respect to this second prong, 
courts consider, inter alia, whether the invention’s functions are “‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the 
industry.”59 
As a result of this trilogy of cases, it became easier than ever to invalidate 
patents under § 101, often at much earlier stages of litigation.60  Jeff Cicarella, 
for instance, explained how patents owned by the Cleveland Clinic on an 
important diagnostic tool were invalidated at the pleading stage under Mayo 
without claim construction or consideration of expert testimony.61  Manny 
Schecter opined that recent § 101 jurisprudence has created major obstacles for 
companies like IBM working in Artificial Intelligence (AI) because AI 
“intersects with the judicial exception on abstractness but the Supreme Court has 
never ever told us what  abstractness means.”62  While the speakers recognize 
that the Federal Circuit and PTO are doing their best to bring some clarity to § 
101, they seem to agree that legislation is necessary at this point.63   Indeed, 
some believe that the best legislative fix would be for Congress to eliminate the 
judicially-created exceptions to § 101.64 
                                               
 54. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 55. 537 U.S. 208 (2014) 
 56. See, e.g., Amy Landers, The Interconnections Between Entrepreneurship, Science, and 
the Patent System, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 631, 634 (2016); Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming 
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 647 (2018). 
 57. Alice, 537 U.S. at 217. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 225 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). 
 60. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 651 (2018) 
(“[T]he invigorated patent eligibility requirement is, like Congress’s expansion of post-issuance 
proceedings at the PTO, another route to quick decisions on patent validity.”). 
 61. See infra at 642–43. 
 62. Id. at 635. 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 625 (acknowledging that there have been some “good panel decisions[s] 
of…the Federal Circuit” on § 101 issues, but “despite [the Federal Circuit’s] best efforts to cope,” 
there’s “chaos up and down the Courts”) (Kappos, D.); id. at 629 (“The [Patent] Office is doing 
everything it can to fix what it can fix, but legislation is needed to help fix other aspects of the 
system that were wired in by the AIA and we now know need to be adjusted . . . .”) (Kappos, D.). 
 64. Id. at 644 (“I like the idea I heard in the first panel about the legislative revision to 101 to 
do away with the exceptions to create clarity.”) (Pilz, B.). 
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Aside from patentable subject matter, the other topic that received a good deal 
of attention at the IIPCC conference was injunctive relief—again, something 
unrelated to the AIA.  During the push for patent reform, one of the primary 
complaints from accused infringers was that patent trolls were using the threat 
of permanent injunctions to extort settlements.65  Such threats were effective 
because, under Federal Circuit law at the time, injunctive relief was almost 
automatic once infringement had been established.66  Thus, the earliest patent 
reform bill proposed to limit injunctive relief by requiring the court to “consider 
the fairness of the remedy in light of all the facts and the relevant interests of the 
parties associated with the invention.”67  Congress never had the opportunity to 
act on this proposal, however, because the Supreme Court decided eBay v. 
MercExchange68 in 2006, less than a year after the first reform bill was 
introduced. The eBay Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s automatic injunction 
rule and held that courts must consider the traditional four-factor standard for 
permanent injunctions in all types of cases.69  As a consequence of eBay, it has 
become much more difficult for patent owners to obtain permanent 
injunctions.70  In Paul Michel’s words, it is “almost impossible” to get a 
permanent injunction in the U.S. today, whereas injunctive relief is routine in 
other parts of the world.71  Laurie Self, Vice President and Counsel for 
Government Affairs at Qualcomm, likewise claims that “we are now in a strange 
dynamic where it’s easier to get an injunction in China than it is in the United 
States.”72  In fact, Self believes the inability to obtain injunctive relief is the 
biggest problem facing patent owners today.73 
As you read the transcripts from the IIPCC conference and hear more about 
the problems with the current patent system in the U.S., keep in mind that—as 
is usually the case—there are two sides to the story.  The changes that have come 
about in recent years were motivated, in large part, by evidence that the former 
patent system was inefficient, subject to abuse by trolls, and often unfair to 
                                               
 65. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation As an Effective Strategy Against 
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 166 (2006) (“[A] 
patent troll makes heavy use of the threat of litigation—and the threat of an injunction—to force a 
license of its patent.”). 
 66. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.2d 1266, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 67. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7. 
 68. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 391–92.  The four factors include: (1) patent owner has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering 
the balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, injunctive relief is warranted; and (4) 
public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.  Id. at 391. 
 70. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of obtaining injunctions post-eBay). 
 71. See infra at 626. 
 72. Id. at 644. 
 73. Id. 
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accused infringers.74  If the current climate is less favorable to patent owners, 
supporters argue, that simply means the legislative and judicial reforms are 
working as intended.  With respect to the PTAB, for example, its purpose was 
to provide an expert tribunal that “facilitate[s] both the validation of properly 
issued patents and the elimination of invalid patents.”75  As the former Chief 
Judge of the PTAB said in response to criticism from Radar and others that the 
tribunal was invalidating too many patents, if the PTAB was not “doing some 
‘death squadding,’ [it] would not be doing what the [AIA] calls on [the PTAB] 
to do.”76  Moreover, while the PTAB initially invalidated patent claims at a 
seemingly high rate, the pace has slowed, suggesting that the worst of the bad 
patents were quickly and easily invalidated in the early years of the PTAB—
exactly the result Congress hoped to achieve.77  Perhaps more importantly, data 
indicate that the PTAB’s invalidation rate is actually quite similar to that of its 
European counterpart and U.S. district courts, thus undermining the claim that 
the PTAB is a “death squad.”78 
Turning to the issues of § 101 and permanent injunctions, there are also 
arguments on both sides about the impact of the recent changes.  For a long time, 
courts broadly interpreted the judicially-created exceptions to § 101 (i.e., laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas) to preclude the patenting of 
business methods,79 computer software,80 and certain types of innovations in 
                                               
 74. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle 
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1676 (2007) (discussing how the threat of injunctions gives 
patentees “highly disproportionate leverage over . . . accused infringer[s]” and how “[c]urrent 
institutional arrangements do not make it easy for companies to challenge the validity of ‘mistake’ 
patents”). 
 75. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the 
Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
235, 236 (2015) (explaining that Congress created post-grant review proceedings to “improve the 
likelihood that invalid patents would be quickly weeded out of the system” to reduce the burden on 
innovation caused by patent thickets”). 
 76. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW 360, 
Aug. 14, 2014. 
 77. See, e.g., Brian Berliner, Sina Aria & Alex Boyadjian, Busting 3 Myths About the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, LAW 360, Aug. 9, 2018 (arguing that PTAB data shows that “AIA 
proceedings have been sufficiently fair to patent owners”). 
 78. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (2015); Josh Landau, A Little More than Forty Percent: Outcomes at the 
PTAB, District Court, and the EPO, PATENT PROGRESS (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/05/01/a-little-more-than-forty-percent/. 
 79. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010) (“For centuries, it was considered well 
established that a series of steps for conducting business was not, in itself, patentable.”) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
 80. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that method for updating 
alarm limits during catalytic conversion was not subject to patent protection). 
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biotechnology.81  That began to change in the 1980s and continued for the next 
decade or so as the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit broadened the scope 
of what’s patentable under § 101,82 thus leading to a proliferation of new patents 
granted by the PTO.83  When the Internet bubble burst in the 2000s, many of 
these software and business method patents were acquired by PAEs and 
enforced in unscrupulous ways, as discussed earlier.84 During that same time 
frame, concerns were mounting that some biotechnology patents were harming 
patients and impeding innovation.85  It was these circumstances that led to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo, Myriad, and Alice in an attempt to bring 
some balance back to our patent system. 
Like the broad scope of § 101, the ease with which patent owners could get 
permanent injunctions was another primary impetus for patent reform.86  The 
PAEs who acquired software and business method patents in the early 2000s 
used those patents, together with the threat of an injunction, to force accused 
infringers to pay nuisance settlements.87  The Supreme Court addressed the 
injunctive relief problem in eBay, as discussed above.  And while critics contend 
that eBay has made it difficult for patent owners across-the-board to get 
permanent injunctions, a study by Professor Christopher Seaman reaches a 
different conclusion.88  Specifically, Seaman studied post-eBay patent decisions 
and concluded that district courts are systematically denying injunctive relief 
only for patent owners that do not compete directly with the accused infringer.89  
Direct competitors, by contrast, continue to seek and secure permanent 
injunctions when they have established infringement.90 
The bottom line is that our current patent system looks the way it does for a 
reason.  There was a strong consensus before the AIA that the patent system was 
out of whack and unfairly favored patent owners.  Thus, a slew of changes was 
                                               
 81. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (holding that a 
composition of two naturally occurring bacteria was not patentable). 
 82. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a genetically-
modified bacterium could be patented); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting business methods exception to patentability 
as “ill- conceived”). 
 83. Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 771 (2018); La Belle & Schooner, supra note 19, at 449. 
 84. Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 83, at 771. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 74, at 1676. 
 87. Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 83, at 771. 
 88. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After Ebay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2016). 
 89. Id. at 1953.  Seaman points out that this de facto rule itself contradicts the eBay decision, 
which rejected a categorical approach to injunctive relief.  Id. 
 90. Id.  See also Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 441 n.140 (2009) (stating that post-eBay 
“direct competitors are almost always entitled to an injunction following a finding of validity and 
infringement whereas indirect competitors are almost always not so entitled”). 
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implemented by Congress, the courts, and the PTO in an attempt to restore 
balance to the patent system.  It is possible, of course, that the pendulum has 
swung too far in the other direction and patent owners are now at a distinct 
disadvantage for the reasons discussed at the IIPCC conference.  Yet, 
bombarding the system with a whole host of new changes is not the solution to 
this problem.  Instead, a piecemeal approach—which is already underway—is 
more likely to achieve the balance necessary for a well-functioning patent 
system.91 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
When Donald Trump became President, it was predicted that the tenor of 
discussions on innovation policy would shift in a pro-patent owner direction.92  
In the two years since the election, those predictions have proven accurate.  
Evidence of this shift includes recent statements by the Head of DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division that “patent holders rarely create antitrust concerns,”93 and Trump’s 
ceremonial signing of the ten millionth patent issued by the PTO.94  Still, the 
clearest indicator of the Trump administration’s patent policy priorities has 
appropriately come from the PTO Director, Andrei Iancu, himself.95 
Shortly after he assumed office in early 2018, Iancu declared that the patent 
system is at a crossroads, and that “we cannot continue down the same path if 
we want to maintain our economic leadership.”96  Iancu then set out two 
principal policy objectives: first, increasing the reliability of the patent grant, 
and second, creating a dialogue that is pro-innovation and pro-patents.97  At the 
IIPCC conference, the Director re-emphasized this latter point about the 
narrative surrounding the patent system,98 while simultaneously stressing the 
                                               
 91. David J. Kappos & Christopher P. Davis, Functional Claiming and the Patent Balance, 
18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 365 (2015) (“The central premise of the patent system, and the key to its 
operability as an innovation engine, is balance.”). 
 92. Jeff John Roberts, What Trump Means for the U.S. Patent System, FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 
2017, http://fortune.com/2017/01/24/trump-patents/. 
 93. Dennis Crouch, Patents and Antitrust: Trump DOJ Sees Little Connection, PATENTLY-O 
(Feb. 18, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/patents-antitrust-connection.html. 
 94. U.S. Patent 10 Million, USPTO, https://10millionpatents.uspto.gov/patent-10-
million.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2018). 
 95. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, PTO Proposes Rulemaking to Implement Phillips Claim 
Construction at PTAB, IP WATCHDOG (May 8, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/08/ 
pto-proposed-rulemaking-phillips-claim-construction-ptab/id=96995/ (explaining that Iancu “has 
been giving speeches raising the hopes of patent owners”). 
 96. Remarks by Director Andrei Iancu at U.S. Chamber of Commerce Patent Policy 
Conference, USPTO (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-
director-andrei-iancu-us-chamber-commerce-patent-policy-conference. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See infra at 648 (“[T]he community needs to have confidence in the [patent] system and 
relentless criticism of the system from any side reduces the industry’s confidence in the system”). 
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need for balance.99 More recently, however, Iancu’s remarks have taken a 
decidedly pro-patent owner turn.  In a talk to the Eastern District of Texas Bar 
Association, Iancu called patent troll concerns “Orwellian ‘doublespeak’”100 and 
issued a warning: 
In our zeal to eliminate “trolls” and “the bad patents” they allegedly 
use to terrorize society, we have overcorrected and risk throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater.  This must now end, and we must restore 
balance to our system….  [S]caring our inventors and our 
entrepreneurs is harmful. And scaring our government officials drives 
towards over-broad policies that, on balance, inhibit innovation.101 
Iancu criticized those who complain about trolls as anti-innovation, and 
proclaimed that the PTO is now focused on inventors and the benefits they 
bestow on the public.102 
More important than these platitudes, however, are the key policy initiatives 
that Iancu has implemented at the PTO.  For one, shortly after Iancu took the 
helm, the PTO issued guidance to its examining corps on § 101 based on a recent 
Federal Circuit decision in  Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,103 which provided some 
clarity on how to apply the second prong of the Alice test.104  While it’s too soon 
to understand the full impact of the Berkheimer memo, it is expected to 
counteract the Myriad/Mayo/Alice trilogy of cases and allow more patent 
applications to pass muster under § 101.105  Indeed, early data indicate that is 
precisely what’s happening, as the PTAB is overturning significantly more § 101 
rejections than before Berkheimer.106 
                                               
 99. Id. (“I caution balance and an even-keeled approach . . . .  From the get-go, the founders 
believed that there needs to be a balance in the system inherently for the system to work it needs to 
be balanced.”). 
 100. Remarks by Director Iancu at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural 
Texas Dinner, USPTO (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-
director-iancu-eastern-district-texas-bar-association-inaugural-texas. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 104. USPTO, MEMORANDUM RE CHANGES IN EXAMINATION PROCEDURE PERTAINING TO 
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documen 
ts/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF; see also John M. Rogitz, USPTO Memo Explains Changed 
Alice Step 2B to Examiners, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 20, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/20/uspto-memo-changed-alice-step-2b examiners/id=96153 
/. 
 105. See, e.g., Julian Asquith & Tobias Eriksson, Worldwide: The Berkheimer Memorandum—
Good News For Software Patents In The U.S., MONDAQ (July 16, 2018), 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/719506/Patent/The+Berkheimer+Memorandum (“[W]e are 
cautiously optimistic that the Berkheimer memorandum heralds a significant change to the 
interpretation of subject-matter eligibility in the US.”). 
 106. Karam Saab, Overcoming Subject Matter Rejections: The Berkheimer Shift, LAW 360 
Aug. 6, 2018, https://www.law360.com/articles/1070216/overcoming-subject-matter-rejections-
the-berkheimer-shift (noting a 23% increase in reversal rates). 
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In addition to addressing § 101, the PTO has also effected important changes 
with respect to PTAB.  By way of example, the PTO has amended the PTAB 
Trial Practice Guide to allow patentees to file sur-replies as a matter of right, 
effectively granting them the “last word” in PTAB proceedings before the oral 
hearing.107  Even more significant, the day before the IIPCC conference, the 
PTO proposed new rules regarding the claim construction standard that PTAB 
should use. 108 Having received and considered hundreds of comments, the 
agency subsequently promulgated the claim construction rules, which became 
effective on November 13, 2018.109  In short, the new rules mandate that PTAB 
interpret disputed patent claim terms in accordance with Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.110—the same standard that district courts use—rather than the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard that PTAB had been using before.111  As with 
the changes to § 101, only time will tell the extent to which this new standard 
has affected PTAB proceedings.  But the expectation is that the Phillips standard 
will make it somewhat more difficult to challenge patents in IPR, and thus patent 
owners should gain from this switch.112 
Along with the PTO, the courts have taken steps that may very well shift the 
tide in favor of patent owners.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court have issued opinions in crucial cases that inure to the benefit of patent 
owners.  As mentioned above, Berkheimer has made it more difficult to 
invalidate patents under § 101, particularly at an early stage of the proceeding, 
because the Federal Circuit held that the second prong of the Alice test—
“[w]hether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled 
artisan at the time of the patent”—is a question of fact that must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.113  The court went on to explain that “[t]he mere 
fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art . . . does not mean it was 
well-understood, routine, and conventional.”114  In other words, the court 
clarified, proving the second prong of the Alice test takes more than showing 
                                               
 107. See Ryan Davis, PTAB Practice Guide Changes Will Aid Patent Owners, LAW 360, Aug. 
14, 2018, https://www.law360.com/articles/1072738/ptab-practice-guide-changes-will-aid-patent-
owners. 
 108. See infra at 649–50 (Iancu, A.) (discussing the changes to PTAB the PTO has the power 
to make). 
 109. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340 (Nov. 13, 2018). 
 110. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 111. See Dennis Crouch, Final Rule Package: Phillips Standard to be Used by PTAB in IPR 
Claim Construction, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 10, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/10/phillips-
standard-construction.html. 
 112. Id.; see also Justin L. Krieger & Christopher Thomas, Final Rules: PTAB Adopts Phillips 
Standard for AIA Trials, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/Insights/Alert/2018/10/Final-Rules-PTAB-Adopts-Phillips-
Standard-for-AIA-Trials (“[T]he shift to the Phillips standard will be seen as a victory for patent 
owners since claims may be construed more narrowly and less likely to read on the prior art.”). 
 113. 881 F.3d at 1368. 
 114. Id. at 1369. 
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that the technology was publicly available.115  Thus, although the ultimate § 101 
question is a legal one, there are factual determinations underpinning that 
decision that frequently cannot be made at the pleadings or summary judgment 
stage of a lawsuit.116  Assuming it remains good law,117 Berkheimer will push  § 
101 decisions later in the litigation—a welcome change for patent owners.118 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu119 is 
also likely to move patent policy in a pro-patent owner direction.120  SAS held 
that when the PTAB institutes an inter partes review, it must issue a final written 
decision addressing the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has 
challenged.121  This means that partial institutions are no longer permitted, which 
may well cause PTAB to institute fewer IPRs in the first place as a way of 
managing its workload.122  And even when the PTAB does institute IPR, patent 
owners should still benefit because the final decision will likely uphold the 
patentability of some of the challenged claims.  Due to the AIA’s estoppel 
provisions, those patent claims upheld by the PTAB should then be immune 
                                               
 115. Michael Borella, Berkheimer v. HP Inc., PATENT DOCS (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/02/berkheimer-v-hp-inc-fed-cir-2018.html (“[T]he Court is 
distinguishing between whether a technology is ‘known’ in the sense of § 102 . . . and whether one 
of ordinary skill would find this technology to be well-understood, routine, and conventional.”). 
 116. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. 
 117. Although the Federal Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc, see 890 F.3d 1369 
(May 31, 2018), HP has filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, to which the Court 
requested a response.  See HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/hp-inc-v-berkheimer/ (last visited Dec. 15).  Several amicus briefs have already 
been filed in the case.  Id. 
 118. See Scott Graham, Federal Circuit Won’t Budge From Decision Reining in ‘Alice,’ NAT’L 
L.J. (May 31, 2018) (stating that Berkheimer “would shift leverage back to the patent owner side”); 
Gugliuzza, supra note 60, at 677 (explaining that recent changes to patent doctrine, including the § 
101 trilogy of cases, have facilitated quick decisions in patent disputes that “allow defendants to 
avoid liability for infringement . . . [but] offer little help to patentees seeking quick adjudication of 
meritorious claims”). 
 119. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 120. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, SAS Institute v. Iancu: Shifting IPR and Litigation Strategies, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 24, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/institute-litigation-
strategies.html. 
 121. 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60. 
 122. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board could simply deny a petition containing challenges having no ‘reasonable likelihood’ of 
success.”); see also Gene Quinn & Renee C. Quinn, SAS: When the Patent Office Institutes IPR It 
Must Decide Patentability of All Challenged Claims, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 25, 2018) (Comments 
of Terry Clark), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/sas-patent-office-institutes-
ipr/id=96297/ (“[T]he Board may exercise its discretion more often in declining to institute IPRs”); 
id. (Comments of Terry Clark) (“[T]his decision may have the unexpected result of reducing the 
percentage of petitions actually granted.”); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, First Steps After SAS Institute, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/first-steps-institute.html (“The 
incentive of the Patent Office, meanwhile, is likely to deny institution relatively more often in the 
wake of SAS Institute, at least initially.”). 
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from further challenge.123  Simply put, SAS has put “greater teeth” into the PTAB 
estoppel provisions in a way that will favor patent owners.124 
It is possible, of course, that these changes—the new claim construction 
standard, Berkheimer, and SAS—will not have the positive effect for patent 
owners that many have predicted.125  But they could, and it’s simply too early to 
know for sure.  What we do know, however, is that making a bunch of changes 
to the patent system at once—which is arguably what happened leading up to 
the AIA—can swing the pendulum too far in the other direction.  While 
legislation like the STRONGER Patents Act may be attractive in theory, there is 
little chance that such a major overhaul would achieve the delicate balance that 
our patent system requires.126  The better approach, which is well underway 
since Director Iancu took office, is incremental reform led by the PTO—the 
entity that should serve as the nation’s primary policymaker on innovation.127  
Admittedly, this takes more time and patience than comprehensive reform like 
the STRONGER Patents Act, and thus is less responsive to the short-term 
interests of certain stakeholders.128 Yet for the public—the primary beneficiary 
of our patent system129—history makes clear that it’s the right path to take.130 
                                               
 123. Berliner et al., supra note 77 (arguing that SAS “may limit the petitioner’s ability to assert 
secondary challenges in the district court”). 
 124. Quinn & Quinn, supra note 122 (Comments of Sharon Israel & Van Lindberg); Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, Renewed Efficiency in Administrative Patent Recovation, 1, 14 (2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237841 (explaining that, after SAS, “the only way to entertain any 
arguments is to adjudicate all arguments,” which comes with “the full scope of estoppel”). 
 125. To be sure, some predict that the net effect of SAS will be to help petitioners, not patent 
owners, because it will: (1) complicate PTAB proceedings and make them even more expensive 
than they already are, (2) make district courts more likely to grant stays pending the outcome of 
PTAB proceedings, and (3) put more of the patent owner’s claims at risk of invalidation.  See, e.g., 
id. (Comments of Stephen Kunin, Rubén Muñoz, & S. Benjamin Pleune). 
 126. See, e.g., Claude Barfield & John E. Calfee, Congress’s Patent Mistakes, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 29, 2007, at A18 (arguing that Congress should not pass comprehensive legislation that 
culminated in AIA because “[i]ncremental reform is a better idea than radical change”); Colleen V. 
Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 326 (2012) (“[H]istory teaches away 
from broad based legislative reform and towards narrowly tailored incremental reform with lessons 
for today.”). 
 127. See Megan M. La Belle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1920–
21 (2016) (discussing the PTO’s policymaking role); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 275, 306 (2010) (same). 
 128. See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, How the Stronger Patents Act Would Send Innovation Overseas, 
EFF (June 23, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/how-the-stronger-patents-act-would-
send-innovation-overseas (“The STRONGER Patents Act shows how far certain patent owners are 
willing to go to serve their narrow interests at the expense of everyone else.”). 
 129. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that patents are to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”). 
 130. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled 
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2081 (2009) (discussing the benefit for 
our patent system of incremental reform by the PTO). 
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PANEL I: ASSESSMENT FROM THE TRENCHES—WHERE WE ARE TODAY 
 
MR. LANGER: So we’re going to start off with the first panel that includes 
former Judge Paul Michel, the Honorable Randall Rader, Dick Thurston, and 
David Kappos, and Mr. Phil Johnson is going to MC this panel for us.  And, 
Phil, would you like to sit or would you like to do it from the podium? 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay.  The introductions are out of the way.  We’re going 
to start with an easy first question, which I’m going to direct to Dick.  Getting 
right down to it, Dick, how do you see the U.S. patent system today?  How well 
is it doing?  Is it encouraging innovation?  Is it rewarding innovation?  How is 
it doing for investment? 
MR. THURSTON: I see it as a mixed bag, actually.  I think I have the 
perspective as a General Counsel, and earlier Assistant General Counsel, of 
major high-tech companies.  And I think that the points though that were just 
being made in the slides and my current life—both as a lawyer and also as a 
mayor of a town that’s trying to promote development—and particularly high-
tech development in the state of New York—I see two different sides to that 
coin.  And, in fact, the middle portion of the coin seems to be more prevalent 
and part of the issue when it comes to start-up companies is I have the difficulty 
in helping companies raise money because actually the VC investment is either 
fewer or it’s more particular.  On the other hand, I’m representing a company 
that’s working in nuclear fusion and it doesn’t get the patents issues from the 
Patent Office because of the issues that were just briefly alluded to. 
For a high-tech company, I think that that’s a major company and it’s 
probably—well, it is definitely in that one percent category.  I think TSMC is 
now in the top 10 issuers in the United States.  There it’s not really effecting 
innovation because innovation—they invest the R&D monies regardless of 
whether or not the patents are issued and particularly for TSMC and a number 
of my clients throughout Asia, we’re taking more and more a trade secret 
approach because of either difficulties in getting patents issued, but largely 
because of the growth of industrial espionage and also the advancement of 
technologies.  With the way the claims are being proved, it makes it sometimes 
difficult for us to protect in the courts.  So that’s the general high level and we 
can come back to more detail. 
MR. JOHNSON: Director Kappos, I’m going to apologize right now if I use 
first names when I should be more formal.  Director Kappos, you’ve seen this 
from many different sides: a long time at IBM, then, of course, your time leading 
the Patent Office and implementing the American Invents Act, and now out in 
private practice representing a whole variety of clients.  Do you agree?  And 
what differences do you see in how the system is working, especially the patent 
part of the system? 
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DIRECTOR KAPPOS: Yeah, so, well, the way I would put it is I think that 
our system has clearly become degraded—particularly the U.S. patent system.  I 
don’t think there’s any serious doubt about that any more when an objective 
study done by the U.S. Chamber drops the U.S. patent system to the number 12 
strongest in the world.  We’re number 12.  Hard to get excited about that.  And 
we’re headed down, too.  It’s not like a one-year thing.  It’s a downward spiral 
that we’re in.  I think it’s hard to say anything but that we have inflicted some 
wounds on ourselves that are pretty bad—particularly in the area of Section 
101131 and statutory subject matter, where it now demonstrably true that 
inventions that are patentable in Europe and the People’s Republic of China for 
important biotech innovations and software innovations—those very same 
inventions are not patentable in the Unites States of America.  I never would 
have thought I’d have to say that we’ve come to this point, but we have, and I 
think that’s pretty bad. 
And in another—of course, there’s issues that are brought on by the PTAB 
and we’ll probably talk about those as we go forward—so I won’t go into those 
in detail.  But I think it’s also worth mentioning something that’s not necessarily 
on everyone’s radar screen: that we live in a world in which more and more 
heavyweight innovation is delivered, deployed through standards, and at the 
same time, we’re seeing rigging of standards bodies—in my view—in flagrant 
violation of any real antitrust principles in order to try and benefit those who get 
a free ride off of standards at the expense of those who spend lots of money 
innovating in those areas. 
I’m hopeful that the new Department of Justice in its leadership to showing 
signs of taking a positive direction on that and really coming down on those who 
manipulate standard setting organizations will be helpful to us in that regard.  
But I have to say, there’s so much innovation getting deployed through 
standards, it’s not a happy situation to see standards bodies that are leaning in 
against the innovators and in favor of those who get a free ride off of innovation.  
So I’m afraid I can’t be too positive with my answer, Phil, but that’s the truth of 
the matter. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge Rader, the defenders of the system—people who are 
contending that it hasn’t been so degraded—point to the numerical difference 
between being first and being twelfth and say, well, it’s not all that big a 
numerical difference and, yet, Director Kappos and others say, well, 
directionally this is significant and it’s especially significant when viewed in 
comparison to what’s going on in other countries who are trying to strengthen 
their patent systems.  What’s your take on the state of play? 
JUDGE RADER: I think we are in a global competition for innovative polices 
and it’s no secret that the entire productive capability of places like China have 
shifted from an emphasis on manufacturing to an emphasis on innovative and 
they devote vast resources to that.  The leadership in intellectual property is 
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simply shifting away from the United States to areas that have a greater 
dedication to supporting R&D, investment, and full-scale innovative policies. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge Michel, I’m sure you have an opinion on the topic. 
JUDGE MICHEL: Well, if we look inwardly, there are other severe warning 
signs beside the Chamber of Commerce ranking where we dropped from first to 
tenth to twelfth in three consecutive years.  So certainly that is a downward trend 
and I agree that it’s likely to go down even further.  But there are many other 
warning signs, and when you take them all you see a very severe picture. 
So, for example, there are indications that average patent valuations are down 
as much as 60 percent since the PTAB and the Supreme Court eligibility 
decisions have taken effect.  There are indications that early stage R&D 
investments is down again about 60 percent.  If you look at who is patenting in 
the last decade or so, independent inventors, as a share of the total, applicants in 
the Patent Office have fallen from about 24 percent to 4 percent.  So it’s now 
one-sixth the proportion of prior times. 
So we saw the graphs about start-up formation.  In a couple years, more start-
ups died in America than were born.  And that’s the first time that’s ever 
happened in our recorded history.  So there are many, many, many warning signs 
besides simply the Chamber of Commerce ranking.  And one more I think is also 
worth mentioning is that the Bloomberg Publications have again a sort of very 
objective numerical ranking based on general innovation robustness and the U.S. 
in the last year fell out of the top 10 for the first time ever in our history.  So 
when I look at all those warning signs, I think we’re in big trouble.  I would even 
quarrel a little bit with the title of this conference, which talks about America’s 
economic future.  I think we’re in big trouble in America’s economic present. 
MR. JOHNSON: Any other comments on this topic before we move on? 
MR. THURSTON: I’d like to add one other point where I see we have a 
fundamental breakdown.  It’s not really purely the Patent Office, but it’s the U.S. 
government.  If you look at where we’re getting out competed, whether it’s by 
China or whether it’s by Japan or Korea, the government has made essential 
policy to support business industrial innovation and patents.  I’ve been dealing 
with the Chinese since 1980.  And from that year on they’ve been dedicating 
huge amounts of money into their patent system, into innovation including also 
trade secret theft and development. 
You look at our innovation in the United States.  I have a lot of friends in the 
New York area.  They are increasingly being lured over to China, not by two 
times, but three times the salaries and compensation.  Even good American 
general counsels are being paid three times what they might get in the United 
States.  The inventors—they’re recruiting at Rensselaer, for example, in New 
York.  So we have a major fundamental structural problem in the U.S. that we 
have to address as well. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, let’s drill down a little bit on something that was 
mentioned earlier and that’s the matter of subject matter eligibility that is the 
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scope of what can be patented and what can’t be patented, which we refer to as 
the 101 problems after the statute defining it. 
Director Kappos, right now there are people who say that the quartet of recent 
Supreme Court cases that have addressed these issues have been very harsh on 
reigning back or drawing down what can be patented than in areas like software, 
business methods, diagnostics, natural materials, certain biopharmaceuticals, 
certain agricultural products and others that you simply can’t patent in this 
country or may not be able to patent things that are routinely patented elsewhere 
in the world.  How do you see this situation?  Is this a matter where the Supreme 
Court has simply left it ambiguous and there’s hope that they’ll fix it or do we 
have to do something different? 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: So, short answer, we have to do something different, 
quite clearly.  The data—despite the micro events that we see—within any 
particular week, there might be a good panel decision of some panel of the 
Federal Circuit.  What you find when you look at the data in aggregate over the 
period of time since the four decisions, capped off with the Alice decision now 
several years ago—and I do track this data with help from experts who count the 
cases—we’re looking at, if I remember right, in the fourth quarter of 2017, 
something like 100 decisions at the District Court in the Federal Circuit level 
against patentability on 101 grounds, followed by, it might have been 90 the next 
quarter. 
So we’re looking at numbers that are stunningly high compared with one, two, 
three per quarter before the Supreme Court took aim at subject matter eligibility.  
So I think if you just look at the data, the macro trend, and look at it over a period 
of time, you have to say the situation is definitely not getting better in aggregate.  
Perhaps you can say, if you’re an extreme optimist, it’s not getting any worse.  
But that’s a little bit like being a terribly ill patient and being told at least you’re 
not getting any worse.  It’s a pretty bad place to be. 
So that’s the data.  It definitely shows that things have radically changed in 
the U.S.  The Supreme Court put down a new legal test that is unadministerable 
by the PTO.  And this is why you see the agency, despite its very best efforts, 
repeated attempts at guidelines, repeated refinements of them trying to adapt to 
the case law quickly.  All good steps, but they’re all in a sense doomed by the 
fact that they’re dealing with an unadministratable situation.  I’d imagine if you 
were tasked with running an agency of around 8,500 or so dedicated people, 
smart people coming into the office every day to do the right thing and you told 
them doing the right thing, means asking yourself for hundreds of thousands 
complicated disclosures every year.  For each disclosure, whether it’s abstract, 
that is the epitome of a personal test—of a test that cannot be rendered repeatable 
according to rules and, therefore, we should not be surprised that the agency is 
struggling and we’re dealing with chaos. 
And, of course, the same thing at the District Courts.  And the Federal Circuit, 
despite its best efforts to cope, some good decisions.  You’ve got tremendous 
panel dependency.  You’ve got chaos up and down the Courts. 
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So one other thing I would say, Phil, and then I will turn it back over to others, 
is in addition to the data, it’s always useful to actually understand individual case 
studies.  What’s happening to small, innovative companies on the ground?  And 
you don’t have to go very far to find examples of extreme stress now.  And I’ll 
just give you one that is hopefully getting more publicity these days, that’s so 
sad to me that you don’t know whether to laugh or cry when you talk about these 
things: the Cleveland Clinic, right?  A great institution out in the Ohio swing-
state area.  Several years ago, many of you may know, they come up with the 
invention or the discovery of an important enzyme correlation—uh-oh, that’s a 
terrible word.  A correlation, right?  We used to think they were patentable, but 
now we know they’re not.  And that correlation resulted in something even more 
terrible: a diagnostic.  Oh, my God. 
That’s the worst thing in the world for patentability.  That diagnostic detected 
the correlation between an enzyme in blood and a high-likelihood of a cardiac 
event.  For those of you who don’t spend time with cardiologists, that means if 
you have this enzyme, you’re going to have a heart attack, and pretty soon.  It 
seems pretty important.  They got three patents.  Those patents seemed fine.  
They built a company, created the diagnostic, put it in the marketplace.  This is 
the American dream.  It should be fine.  But, no, then EDTX finds the patents to 
be invalid—ineligible under 101.  The company’s prospects crater.  It’s divested 
for a loss.  And the Cleveland Clinic is put in the position of instructing its 
researchers, “don’t bother researching diagnostics anymore because they’re 
unpatentable and as a result we can’t get funding to put them into the 
marketplace.”  And as a result we don’t care about that area of human 
investigation. 
That to me is a pretty sad story.  But that’s an actual true story.  You can 
contact the folks at the Cleveland Clinic and verify that all you want.  And it’s 
just one of many examples of the mess we’re in. 
MR. JOHNSON: Others want to share their viewpoints? 
JUDGE MICHEL: In addition to the large number and the large percentage 
of invalidations for ineligible subject matter, we should focus on the fact that 
there are thousands of patents—I would guarantee you tens of thousands of 
patents—maybe hundreds of thousands of patents enforced today whose 
eligibility is totally unpredictable.  So if you’re a venture capitalist, or you’re a 
business leader in an established company, and the question is whether you’re 
going to invest in a new product and take all the risks and wait for five or ten 
years to make a profit on it, are you going to invest in that?  And the answer is 
absolutely not.  It’s become way too risky, way too unreliable.  And the 101 
problem, of course, doesn’t exist in isolation.  I know we’ll talk about the PTAB 
problem, but there are still other problems, all of which converge to enfeeble the 
American patent system today. 
So, for example, we talk about our competitive situation.  In the United States, 
it’s almost impossible to get an injunction.  In Germany, it’s routine.  In China, 
it’s becoming routine.  In the United States, it takes five to ten years to get a final 
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judgement, where if you have a valid infringed patent, somebody actually has to 
write a check to pay you damages.  In Germany, it takes about a year.  In 
England, much the same.  The cost of litigation in America is horrendous.  The 
PTAB, quite aside from invalidations, adds per challenge something in the order 
of $300 to $600 thousand dollars per challenge and there are often multiple 
challenges. 
So assume you own a valid patent.  This is now the prelude to district court 
litigation.  So it’s added to the costs which already were in the millions and so 
now you have another half a million, million or whatever upfront.  So, again, the 
investment decision becomes “no, I’m not going to do it.”  The gauntlet is too 
long.  It’s too risky.  It’s too expensive.  It’s too uncertain.  It’s too unpredictable.  
So what’s happening?  The money is going out of R&D in technology into 
entertainment and other things that are less risky.  Build a casino.  Make a movie.  
Don’t back technology.  And it’s also going increasingly out of the United States 
to China, to Europe, and to other places that have comparative better patent 
systems.  That’s economic suicide by the installment plan. 
MR. JOHNSON: Let’s move on since you’ve started down that road, and 
Judge Rader, I’ll direct this to you.  The American Invents Act now is six years 
old and the post-grant challenge procedures that go before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board, called the PTAB, are now five years old.  Back—early on, I think 
in an interview that Todd Dickinson had with you—you predicted, based on 
what you were seeing, that these PTAB proceedings would become a killing 
field for patents and that the PTAB itself was acting like a death squad.  Now in 
the intervening five years, you have a chance now to say you were right or wrong 
or under or overstated it and I’ve been waiting at least five years to be the 
position where I could ask you that question.  So what’s your take on how it’s 
going? 
JUDGE RADER:  Well, I, with humility, might have gotten that one right.  
There’s a couple of interesting observations.  Back when David and I were 
monitoring and working on the passage of the AIA, it was very clear in a vote 
in both houses, I believe, that we were closing what was called the second 
window.  And yet, we’ve seen the PTAB become not only a second window, but 
a third, fourth, fifth, and eternally open window and that has resulted in another 
very consequential unintended consequence. 
Remember the PTAB was designed to replace with a swifter and easier and 
cheaper alternative to district court proceedings.  Well, in the first place, district 
courts never invalidated at a 60 to 70 percent rate.  So it doesn’t replace in that 
sense.  But even more important, this is adding two years and you still come 
back to a district court.  In many instances it has added to the expense and the 
time of the proceeding without any really concomitant benefit. 
I’d make one last comment, and that is anecdotally I’ve observed that it hasn’t 
even hit the main target it was supposed to hit, which is the patent troll case.  In 
those cases you simply lowered the value of the case from slightly below the 
defense value in a district court to now slightly below the defense value in the 
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PTAB.  So it’s not hitting the target.  It isn’t making things cheaper, faster, and 
easier.  And it is resulting in vast deaths of otherwise important inventions. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge Michel, over 85 percent of the proceedings now in 
the Patent Office involve related District Court litigation and, of those that go to 
final decision, the rate of invalidation of one or more claims of the patents that 
are challenged is also about 85 percent.  Supporters of the system say these are 
bad patents—that you would expect or should expect that kind of invalidation 
rate and that this is a service to the system.  And others argue to the contrary that 
the patents in litigation are amongst the most valuable and should have much 
lower invalidation rates.  How do you see it? 
JUDGE MICHEL: Well, I think that it’s impossible to be able to prove it, but 
I surmise that many patents that are good patents are being invalidated at the 
PTAB.  And I say that based on the difference in District Court invalidation rates 
or reexam invalidation rates versus PTAB rates, which are two to three times 
higher in each case.  But also I based it on the difference in standards of proof 
and other procedures.  In our country, we define justice, fairness, reliability, 
accuracy by what courts do.  So it seems to me the measure of accuracy and 
fairness—due process, if you will—in a PTAB should be by comparing it to 
what happens in a court of law. 
So in a PTAB, mere preponderance wins.  In a court of law, it has to be clear 
and convincing.  In a court of law, you have to have standing.  In the PTAB, you 
don’t have to have standing.  In a court of law, you can get discovery of 
documents that the adverse party holds that help prove your case.  In the PTAB, 
as a practical matter, you can’t.  In a court of law, where you have dueling 
experts, they’re both on the stand where the adjudicators—whether it’s a judge 
or jury, or in the case of the PTAB, the three Administrative Patent Judges—not 
only see and hear the witnesses live and their conflicting testimony, but also get 
to ask questions themselves.  The PTAB, they never have live testimony.  So the 
glaring disparities between the procedures and the burdens and the process in 
the PTAB compared to the District Court tells me that the PTAB is inherently 
unfair. 
MR. JOHNSON: Director Kappos, this week the new director has just 
announced that at least one change is proposed and that is a change in the way 
that claims are construed.  I know you have been looking at this for a long time.  
Do you have any comments as to whether that’s going to in and of itself fix the 
problem or otherwise?  What’s your take on that? 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: Thanks, Phil.  So, first of all, the PTO is moving in 
the right direction.  Moving from the BRI standard to the Phillips standard was 
clearly the right thing to do.  The Office knows now things that weren’t known 
before that made it clearly in the interest of the system to move to that standard.  
I do not think this is a sort of a one and done change by the PTO.  I would expect 
that there will be more things coming and I think that’s great.  I think they’re 
taking a measured approach and rolling out the changes that have been needed 
and doing what they can do within the system.  I do think that we’ve learned a 
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lot, as has been pointed out by others on the panel, about aspects of the system 
that haven’t worked the way we wanted them to when we designed it now around 
six years ago or so. 
The Office is doing everything it can to fix what it can fix, but legislation is 
needed to help fix other aspects of the system that were wired in by the AIA and 
we now know need to be adjusted and, fortunately, we’ve got that legislation in 
the STRONGER Patents Act.132  It has 20 sponsors on the House side, 
cosponsors on the House side, R&D.  It has a range of sponsors on the Senate 
side.  So I think we’re now within sight of the changes that are needed—both 
within the agency and through the follow-on legislation—the changes that we 
need in order to set the PTAB on a really sustainable trajectory. 
MR. JOHNSON: Dick, would you like to add a few comments? 
MR. THURSTON: I agreed with David.  I think though that where we still 
need to look more closely is how the PTAB has been used or abused particularly 
by companies that are looking at it as a means to avoid some of the competitive 
competition issues on the market playing field.  I have had a number of 
companies that approach me and say, “well, look, if we can go and invalidate a 
patent and particularly get the upstream technology”—part of the battle that’s 
being done is the upstream versus downstream, particularly when you look at 
advanced technology.  And where there’s targeting of certain patents to try to 
invalidate it at the PTAB rather go in the Court.  So I think we have to have some 
more procedural reforms that allow our companies also to be more competitive, 
starting with the early stage companies that are at a real disadvantage. 
JUDGE RADER: Could I just add one more small point, Phil? 
MR. JOHNSON: Absolutely. 
JUDGE RADER: And that is the PTAB has upset one careful balance that 
was achieved in the Hatch-Waxman Act133 where there was a negotiated 
settlement between the research drug companies and the generic drug companies 
to ensure they both got great benefits and provided an early challenge to validity 
of patents.  And, indeed, I think this gave birth to the generic industry in many 
respects.  But now you can do an end run on the Hatch-Waxman Act by going 
directly to the PTAB with the lower standards of review that my former 
colleague, Paul Michel, pointed out.  And I think it’s undercutting that careful 
balance and upsetting both research and generic incentives. 
MR. JOHNSON: I think Senator Hatch has recently spoken on that topic and, 
in fact, has suggested that he sees it the same way and feels that challengers 
should choose one route or the other. 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: Wonder where he got that idea? 
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MR. JOHNSON: And, therefore, they could chose the IPR or Patent Office 
challenge route if they wanted to, in which case they’d forego the benefits of 
Hatch-Waxman, which would include I assume the exemption from 
infringement, pre-testing infringement, and the ability to rely on the innovators 
data.  Or to choose the Hatch-Waxman route, in which case they’d forego the 
opportunity to challenge in the Patent Office.  So with that as a background and 
recognizing that Senator Hatch, I think, is in his last term.  He’s not running for 
reelection, would you like to handicap the likelihood that that legislation will get 
through? 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: Well, I do know there are efforts to achieve that and 
they’re received somewhat favorably on both the generic and the research side.  
So, of course, it’s too early to handicap any legislative success in this Congress, 
but this is an area that targeted reform could really do a great benefit. 
MR. JOHNSON: Let’s go back for a minute; we’re about 32 seconds behind, 
but I think we can probably get back on track.  I’d like to know what each of you 
think Director Iancu should do in order to materially improve the situation.  
Perhaps kind of a rapid fire: what are the top two or three things to come to mind 
that you’d like to see the Director do that you think he can do without legislation? 
JUDGE MICHEL: I think that he can make significant, but not sufficient, 
changes in the way that 101 standards are applied during examination by the 
8,000 plus examiners.  And that would do a great deal of good and, actually, it’s 
a little ironic because you could say he’s at the bottom of the pyramid with the 
Supreme Court at the top and the Federal Circuit and then the District Courts 
and then the Patent Office.  But he’s providing leadership that I don’t see coming 
from any of the higher levels, and I think he can continue to do that even on 101.  
And obviously on PTAB, he has very broad authority.  There are eight or ten 
things that the STRONGER Act would fix procedurally in the PTAB and there 
are only two things it can’t fix: standing and burden of proof.  So he can fix 80 
percent of the problems with the PTAB and I think he can fix about 30 percent 
of the problems with eligibility. 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: Well, I agree with that, Judge Michel.  I would just 
add in the 101 area there is a big opportunity to use the platform of the PTO 
directorship to continue to do what’s already being done, which is to call out the 
problem.  It really is a problem, and while we could talk about solutions, we 
need to start with accepting that it’s a problem and to have the Director of the 
PTO saying that is very, very helpful—calling for ideas, calling for suggestions, 
convening meetings, telling members of Congress, telling the Administration 
this is about American competitiveness.  This is about the future of our country, 
health care solutions, jobs, and opportunity for our children.  That is really 
important that’s something that is uniquely within the authority of the PTO 
director to be competent and persuasive and potent at doing. 
MR. THURSTON: Related to what David just said, I think that he should, as 
part of his advisory council, really take a very close look at what is being done 
by some of our competitive countries—whether it’s China, whether it’s Korea, 
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whether it’s Israel—and having a much better understanding of what is really 
happening in some of these areas of law.  Whether it’s software, or also as far as 
the patent process that is being quite advanced.  I think, related to that, where I 
found a hole is also looking at prior art, where the Chinese and the Koreans are 
doing a very sophisticated job of getting to databases that I’m not sure that I see 
accessing here, so more money that would be dedicated to looking at what’s out 
there.  But certainly understanding what China, Korea, Japan and others are 
doing. 
JUDGE RADER: I’d have two quick points.  One is on that Hatch-Waxman 
point.  You could simply not institute PTAB proceedings where there is an 
alternative available in court through the Hatch-Waxman system.  So an 
institution directive.  The other would be where a court has already acted on 
validity, it seems to me that ought to be binding on an administrative agency 
and, therefore, it’s a minority of just a few cases, but where a court has acted, 
that should be binding on the PTAB, perhaps putting an end to their proceedings. 
MR. JOHNSON: So that leaves us with some things that I take it you have 
some agreement on that need to be done by Congress and so I’m going to ask 
you very quickly as our closing round what is it that you think Congress must 
do and what do you think would be beneficial for Congress to do?  And, in this 
context, I’d like you to keep in mind the stability that would be created—the 
relative stability that’s created by statutory change versus a rule change in the 
Office versus an administrative directive and the need of the IP community to 
have reliable and predictable patent protection no matter how it comes out.  So 
whoever wants to start jump in.  We have about three minutes and then I think 
we have a little bit of time for a few questions after that. 
JUDGE MICHEL: Well, I think the question almost answers itself.  Where 
you need permanent and reliability for long term R&D expenditure decisions, a 
statute is the best.  A regulation is the second best.  Some kind of informal 
guidance is the third best.  They all have value. 
I think what Congress needs to do is to take back control of innovation policy 
in America, which is not the proper function or within the competence of the 
Supreme Court, so I hope that Congress will nullify all implied exceptions to the 
four categories in Section 101. 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: And just adding to that a little more granular I would 
say two things that seem that they’re right in front of us right now.  One is 
Congress needs to take up and pass the STRONGER Patents Act.  That starts 
with hearings and then committee markups and the like.  There’s no reason why 
that can’t be done essentially immediately.  And then secondly, on 101 we’re a 
ways behind that point with 101.  Congress needs to start convening hearings 
and getting discussion going and raising the temperature of the issue on 101 in 
this term, which would lead to the possibility of introducing legislation next 
term. 
MR. THURSTON: And then in addition, I think Congress needs to make sure 
it keeps the proper levels of funding and we don’t see any temptations of 
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diversion of funding going forward, which has always been—I remember going 
back to talking with Bruce Lehman, where he was particularly challenged at that 
point in time.  But I think we can’t lose sight of that because that temptation is 
always quite significant. 
JUDGE RADER: An amendment to 101 to protect the statute as it has been 
written and should be enforced would be at the top of the priorities.  Then beyond 
that I think we could look at trying to reclose the second window. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Recognizing the powers of the forces of evil 
with respect to attempts to legislate or influence the judiciary through the fourth 
estate to effect these 101 changes, might a compromise be something in the 
nature of a petty patent that eliminates the 101 criterion for this petty patent that 
retains the 102134 and 103135 criteria and as the quid pro quo shortens the term 
of the petty patent without otherwise compromising it?  I mean I’ve been a patent 
lawyer for 60 years and this is against all of my better instincts, but I see and 
hear everything that’s been going on and it sounds great, but whether it’s going 
to do anything is a separate question.  And so my question is is there a 
compromise along the lines of what I’m suggesting possible in the legislative 
sense? 
MR. JOHNSON: I’m going to take the moderator’s privilege here for a second 
and say as long as you’re happy not making progress on the Alzheimer’s 
treatments or personalize medicine or diagnostics, all of the long lead time types 
of things that are being impacted then I suppose you can talk about that.  But 
you reduce the patent term—the patent term is already too short for 
pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, and many other areas and — 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I don’t know of any pharmaceutical companies 
that are losing money wildly because of too short patent terms, do you? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, actually, I do.  But that’s a topic for another time.  But 
I’ll turn it back to someone on the panel if you’d like to comment further on the 
question. 
JUDGE RADER: I don’t think that would be a very good idea at all.  The one 
infection I see in the Chinese system, which is working so well, are these utility 
models which are kind of petty patents and then infect and degrade and discount 
the system. 
MR. THURSTON: Yeah.  I agree.  Randall, I was going to make the same 
comment.  I think that’s a real disadvantage that we’re facing over there. 
MR. JOHNSON: Do we have other questions?  Rob? 
MR. STERNE: My name is Rob Sterne.  My question is about the elephant in 
the room.  U.S. industry in Silicon Valley believes, in my experience, that we 
don’t need our patent system as a practical matter.  That we can compete on the 
global stage without any serious legal protection because we can out-innovate, 
we can out-think, we can out-market the competition globally.  And now we see 
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the Europeans and the Chinese who are following their lead, strengthening their 
patent systems.  So my question to everyone is how do we convince the titans of 
industry in Silicon Valley that they need a strong U.S. patent system? 
JUDGE RADER: I think competition will convince them on their own.  I can 
tell you right now that 5G technology is not controlled by the United States.  And 
that means the Internet of things won’t be controlled by the United States.  And 
one more anecdote: I have a tremendous cancer-curing type of technology with 
a small biotechnical in Boston, a biopharmaceutical firm.  We’re going to China 
to get a joint venture with the assurance that we can get clearance there within a 
year or two to market our drug, whereas we’d have to wait here for ten to seven 
years. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: So we talked a lot about 101 and what the 
Director can do as far as the 30 percent.  I can appreciate that.  What can he do 
about 103 and guarding against hindsight subjectivity, given the preponderance 
of evidence standard? 
MR. JOHNSON: Who would like to take this one? 
DIRECTOR KAPPOS: I’ll comment briefly on that.  So I think in aggregate 
in general the PTO is quite good at handling 103.  Examiners are trained 
extensively on it.  We have the best rules, I think, of any system on the planet 
relative to examination under the obviousness and related doctrines.  Not to say 
everything goes perfectly every single time, but I think we’ve got a pretty good 
system in that regard.  What’s needed, and it’s a constant sort of like lifetime 
dancing lessons kind of thing, is to keep up with the state of the law and for 
leadership that encourages examiners to make the right decision.  And that 
includes the right decision not only to deny the grant of a patent that shouldn’t 
be granted, but to promptly grant a patent that should be granted.  Because the 
mistake, right—the false negative, if you will—that denies a patent that should 
be granted, has at least much marketplace damage as the false positive of 
granting a patent that shouldn’t. 
So I think it’s really about continued training, which the PTO is very good on, 
following the case law, redoubling efforts with examiners, providing the 
backdrop and management and supervision that picks up issues and corrects 
them.  So I don’t see 103 as being some kind of a magic bullet.  You’re going to 
just put out some edict and cause examiners to radically change their behavior 
because I don’t think you need to.  I think it’s the kind of thing that’s very much 
in the details, very much in the nuance.  And that means training, support—those 
kinds of things. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay.  I’d like to thank our panel.  We are out of time.  I 
appreciate your attention. 
MR. LANGER: Thank you very much, Phil.  A couple quick housekeeping 
announcements.  If you are thirsty and need a drink, we have restocked, so please 
help yourselves.  We’re going to be circulating index cards in a minute here.  
These are for questions.  If you have some already that you would like to pose 
to any of our fireside panelists.  In order to try and keep that panel moving as 
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quickly as possible, we’d prefer not to pass mics.  And I will start circulating 
those in a minute.  There will also be some back in the back of the room. 
So thank you to the Honorable Paul Michel, Honorable Randall Rader, the 
Honorable David Kappos, Dr. Dick Thurston, and special thanks to Mr. Phil 
Johnson for moderating this last panel. 
 
 
PANEL II: STORIES FROM THE TRENCHES—REAL WORLD EXPERIENCES 
 
MR. LANGER: Going to our next panel, and you are welcome to start coming 
up as I call you.  We are honored to have Laurie Self, Vice President and Counsel 
of Government Affairs at Qualcomm; Manny Schecter, the Chief Patent Counsel 
at IBM.  I believe Bryce is here—Bryce Pilz?  Am I saying your last name 
correctly, Bryce?  Bryce is the Director of Licensing at the University of 
Michigan.  Jeff Cicarella, who has joined us from the Cleveland Clinic today.  
Aaric Eisenstein, VP of Personalized Media Communications, and Kim 
Chotkowski, CEO of LES, will be moderating. 
If I could ask everyone to please return to your seats or if you’d like to 
continue your conversation, please step out to the hallway to do so as we are 
going to stay on track.  Great.  And with that, I will turn it over to you, Kim.  Do 
we have enough seats for everyone?  Excellent?  Thank you, Kim. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: I guess, good afternoon.  My name is Kim Chotkowski.  
I am the CEO of the Licensing Executive Society.  I’m sure many of you are 
familiar with that group in this room.  I’d like to first say thank you to the IIPCC 
for inviting me to moderate.  LES, as you know, represents members from the 
entire ecosystem from the intellectual property value chain, and, as such, 
obviously these topics are extremely important to our members.  In addition to 
also having our representation of our members, I believe, as CEO, it’s important 
that we partner with groups like IIPCC and others that share the same concerns 
so as a collective we have a greater voice on the Hill and in the forums that we’re 
looking to do. 
So I’d like to first just introduce my panel and what we are going to really do 
is talk about the war stories.  You’re going to hear from the trenches really how 
IP policy has impacted organizations and the real world effects of that.  So we 
have Manny Schecter, who probably does not need an introduction, but he’s the 
Chief Patent Counsel and Associate General Counsel at IBM.  He leads IBM’s 
worldwide intellectual property law organization on patent matters and advises 
on intellectual property strategy and policy.  And he is located in Armonk. 
Aaric Eisenstein is the Vice President of Licensing Strategy for Personalized 
Media Communications.  PMC is a ten-person company started by its inventor, 
Chairman John Harvey, of which I’ve had the pleasure to get to meet and know 
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and is an amazing gentleman.  The company was founded in 1981 and licenses 
only its internal intellectual property that actually was created by Mr. Harvey. 
Jeffrey Cicarella.  Jeff is Corporate Counsel for the Cleveland Clinic.  We had 
some reference to that a little earlier today, so you’re going to get to really hear 
the story from somebody who knows from the inside.  And he is responsible for 
managing the legal affairs of the Cleveland Clinic Innovations and Cleveland 
Clinic Ventures, which is the IP commercialization and corporate venture arm 
for the Cleveland Clinic.  As Chief Counsel for both CCI and CCV, Jeff handles 
various corporate strategies, the strategic focus, technology commercialization 
transactions, and advises on a variety of other legal and business matters. 
And we have Bryce Pilz.  He is currently the Director of Licensing for the 
University of Michigan, Office of Technology Transfer, which receives 500 new 
inventions from UM researchers and 150 new patent applications every year.  
He’s formerly a faculty member at Michigan Law School and was an attorney 
at Kirkland & Ellis. 
And last, but definitely not least, Laurie—I put you actually, sorry, in the 
wrong order there.  But, Laurie Self is VP and Counsel for Government Affairs 
and she oversees IP policy for Qualcomm.  So we have quite a knowledgeable 
panel here. 
What I really want to do today is have the opportunity for our panel to share 
their stories.  So I’m really going to start right here and ask Manny if you would 
give some of the views of the impact from the trenches. 
MR. SCHECTER: Okay.  Is the mic working okay?  Sounds like it is.  I’m 
going to talk a little bit about the intersection between artificial intelligence and 
Section 101, so some of the things you just heard on the prior panel on Section 
101 will be in play here.  But, let me just start by reminding everybody what we 
mean when we talk about artificial intelligence.  We’re talking about machines 
that don’t just crunch digitized information, but understand natural language and 
think and learn.  In short, they are mimicking human behavior.  And that is for 
us, not only cutting edge technology, it is R&D intensive.  It is one of the most 
important future directions of information technology and it benefits everyone.  
It’s not just about information technology.  It intersects with just about 
everything we do.  And when I say we, I don’t mean IBM.  I mean we, mankind. 
Looping back to Section 101, I don’t want to repeat it but all of the uncertainty 
that’s been created by the Supreme Court just boils down to one thing.  Artificial 
intelligence intersects with the judicial exception on abstractness and the 
Supreme Court has never ever told us what abstractness means.  We don’t know 
what it is.  So I don’t care how many steps you build around the test, if, at its 
core, the word is undefined, which they’ve expressly declined to do, then it’s 
always going to be an uncertain test.  So how does that play out for me? 
Well, first of all, just generally, advising clients in this space has become 
incredibly difficult.  We are met with disbelief amongst the executives.  What 
do you mean the thing that I’m investing all this money in—that is so incredibly 
high-tech—can’t be protected by patent?  It doesn’t make sense to them.  When 
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we get to the Patent Office—there was some discussion of this already, but let 
me put it in a slightly different light—we file a patent application.  It gets 
rejected.  That’s not uncommon, of course.  But we’re used to going into the 
Patent Office and having a collaborative discussion with Examiners to help 
identify just what is patentable in the patent application.  The Examiners now 
refuse to have that discussion.  They admit they don’t know how to advise or to 
engage in that discussion.  In fact, they actually ask us to appeal the case so that 
they can get some guidance from a higher authority.  And, of course, that higher 
authority doesn’t know anything more than they do.  They’re all trying their little 
hearts out, but they’re all in the same boat.  So at the end of the day, they all 
point their finger at the other and we’re just left with the uncertainty. 
When you finally do get some patents, where does that get you?  Well, you 
want to enforce the patent?  Great.  The senior executives come in and ask you, 
“Can I count on this?  Can I count on the patent?  It’s going to be there for me?  
We’re going to win, right?”  Can’t advise them very well on that.  Met with more 
disbelief.  They want to collaborate with a partner.  Great.  We want to have 
patents on that which we’ve already developed to ensure that it’s protected so 
that when we go talk about it with a potential partner, we can rely on the fact 
that that partner is not going run away with what we show them.  Can’t rely on 
it there either.  Same problem.  Really, really a big problem for us. 
So what do you do?  Well, you rely on wherever you can get the protection: 
other GOs, other forms of intellectual property.  But it’s just not the same.  And 
what you’re seeing in artificial intelligence are a lot of companies, including 
IBM, who aren’t selling a product.  We’re not selling a system that has artificial 
intelligence built into it necessarily.  We’re not selling software that gives the 
capability of artificial intelligence to another system.  We’re putting the system 
with all the smarts behind the firewall, and we’re marketing a service in which 
others can get the benefit of artificial intelligence from systems that we have. 
But where does that get you?  It restricts your ability to go to market.  It 
inhibits your ability to collaborate.  Frankly, it inhibits the ability of the customer 
or the end user to distinguish one artificial intelligence system from the other 
because they can’t understand the difference in the systems.  So at the end of the 
day, something has to change or this uncertainty is going to break it.  It’s going 
to break the system. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Thank you.  Do you want pass the mic on down and 
introduce yourself? 
MR. PILZ: Hi, everyone.  Bryce Pilz, Director of Licensing at the University 
of Michigan Tech Transfer Office.  I’m going to talk about the issue with 101 
with medical diagnostics, but first I thought I’d talk a little bit about academic 
tech transfer and the importance of it. 
So we’re the second largest research campus in the country.  We do $1.4 
billion of research each year.  The majority of that comes from federal agencies 
like NIH, NSF.  Like every other major research university, we have a tech 
transfer office.  And our job is to work with our inventors to identify inventions, 
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secure intellectual property protection, develop the technology, and then find a 
partner in industry, either an existing company or a new start-up, to invest 
significantly in R&D to advance that early scientific discovery to a product or 
service that can actually help people in the marketplace. 
Tech transfer has been around for a while: Google search engine, Vitamin D.  
I read an article recently that suggested 30 percent of all new drugs and medical 
devices have come from academic tech transfer.  So it’s a critical part of 
America’s economic engine.  This only works if there is a strong patent system. 
So the technologies that come to us are extremely early stage.  No one comes 
to our office with a product or service.  We are going to industry asking them to 
invest millions, sometimes billions of dollars, to take this early scientific 
discovery and advance it to the point where it can reach the marketplace and 
benefit the public. 
So in the case of medical diagnostics—and when I say medical diagnostics, 
I’m talking about a device or a method that has a scientifically proven way of 
predicting a medical condition based upon the level of a biomarker in the body—
these have a huge potential to vastly improve the healthcare system.  You can 
detect diseases earlier.  You can make sure there’s proper patient monitoring.  
And you can predict more effective outcomes for patients. 
We have had significant problems getting issuances on medical diagnostics.  
I have two examples.  One is in 2009, there was an invention reported to our 
office—a collaboration of U of M researchers, Penn researchers, and Mayo 
researchers—using significant NIH funding.  It’s a diagnostic for predicting the 
onset of age-related macular degeneration.  We licensed it exclusively to an 
international molecular diagnostic company.  They opened up a genetic testing 
facility in the state of Michigan, and started creating the type of jobs that we 
really need in that state as we still recover from the recession. 
The first patent was issued in February of 2012, a month before the 
Prometheus-Mayo136 decision came down.  The subsequent continuations, 
which were focused on critical aspects of the technology allowing you to predict 
the right way to treat this condition, have all been rejected under 101 and have 
since been abandoned.  The company is disinclined to invest further in 
developing technology, disinclined to hire more employees, and we believe will 
eventually shutter the project before it ever makes the market. 
Another example was a more recent invention: a diagnostic for detecting 
graft-versus-host disorder.  So graft-versus-host disorder is when the immune 
cells in a transplant specimen, such as bone marrow, believe the host body is a 
foreign entity and they attack it.  The ability to predict the onset of this, 
obviously, vastly improves outcomes and expensive transplant procedures.  We 
licensed this to an existing biomedical company.  All the patent applications 
filed on this technology have been rejected under 101 and have since been 
abandoned.  There’s a product on market starting to get some traction, but 
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they’re not investing in further developing this technology.  They’re not 
investing in hiring new employees because they believe as soon as they get 
significant traction, large companies will just come in and copy it in the absence 
of patent protection. 
So it’s a critical issue for these companies.  These are just two examples.  We 
have many others.  The problem is particularly acute in the world of start-ups.  
So as existing companies have really scaled back their R&D, academic tech 
transfer is happening more and more through start-up companies.  Existing 
companies sit back and wait for these start-ups to validate the product, validate 
the market, and then they acquire these start-ups. 
We’re hearing significant stories from start-ups about the problems with 101 
for diagnostics impeding their ability to raise capital.  They’re not talking about 
it publicly because they don’t want to admit it.  They don’t want to exacerbate 
the problem and point out the frailty of their IP portfolio.  So we believe that the 
negative commercial consequences of the current status of 101 for diagnostics 
is being vastly underreported and it is a real issue. 
So, up until recently, the policy discussion on medical diagnostics has 
centered around patient access and that’s critically important.  But unless you 
have the right incentives in place to bring medical diagnostic innovations to the 
marketplace, you don’t even get to the question of patient access.  And there are 
probably more precise, lighter-touch ways to address the patient access problem, 
making sure there’s broad and equitable access for all patients, without wiping 
out patent protection for an entire class of medical innovations. 
For example, you could explore compulsory licensing.  You could look for a 
limited exception to infringement for certain types of patient care, but you don’t 
have to wipe out patent protection for all medical diagnostics.  And that’s the 
worst thing happening at the University of Michigan, and we believe it really is 
stifling innovation. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Aaric? 
MR. EISENSTEIN: I work for an individual inventor.  We’ve got close to 100 
patents, which, for Manny, would be a bad week during Christmas time.  I’d like 
to talk about the legislative and regulatory fixes that we’re seeing proposed and 
how we need something like that in order to preserve the opportunities for 
individual inventors.  We’re very, very hopeful that these things are coming and 
they can’t come fast enough. 
Let me tell you about our experience at a very micro, micro level in the grand 
scheme of experiences that we’ve had where, ostensibly on paper, things look 
very reasonable and fair.  But let me tell you how it actually plays out. 
So our little company is involved in litigation after trying to negotiate a license 
with a tech behemoth.  They decide to invite us to the PTAB.  So, you look at 
the PTAB, and the analogy that we always use is that a grand jury indicts and a 
regular jury convicts or doesn’t convict.  But the point is that there’s a two-step 
process there, because what are the odds that the grand jury says they probably 
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ought to go on trial and then turn around and say, “No, it’s alright.  He’s 
innocent.”  Right?  It would never happen, except at the PTAB. 
So at the PTAB, there is not a two-step process.  The same panel institutes 
review and then subsequently rules on it.  Now you can argue about whether or 
not that makes sense.  It’s faster.  It’s more efficient.  They already know what’s 
going on—blah, blah, blah.  Okay.  If you’re talking about one panel or one 
opportunity, bad enough.  Well, we had the opportunity to participate in seven 
IPRs.  How many panels did we get?  One.  So that’s 14 bites at the apple.  Okay? 
So we get through that process.  Eighteen months later we’re invited back to 
the PTAB.  Another five patents of ours are being challenged in IPR.  Guess 
who we get to sit in front of?  Same panel.  Alright?  So you now get the same 
panel looking at you 24 different times.  If you were a petitioner—if you were 
somebody challenging a patent—and you were going against somebody who 
had had their patent validated by a panel 24 times in a row, you don’t need fancy 
money ball software to tell you whether or not you’re going to get that judge to 
help you.  Right? 
That’s the situation that we’re dealing with when we deal with the IPR.  Okay?  
It’s not right.  I’m not a lawyer, so I won’t try and parse whether or not it’s legal 
or good or what have you.  But it’s not right. 
So you then go through the process of trying to amend the claims, working 
through the issues that you have.  And Manny referenced kind of the normal 
process, which is when you typically apply for a patent, what you do is you write 
down your idea, you send it to the Patent Office.  A year or so later, they get 
back to you and they say, “Okay, these are the parts that are good.  These are the 
parts where we have some questions.  And here are the parts where it’s probably 
not right.  But either come meet with us or let’s get on the phone and we’ll kind 
of collaborate iteratively and we’ll work it out.” 
That’s not how it works at the PTAB.  Instead, what happens is we lob a brief 
over to the PTAB.  The other side lobs a brief over to the PTAB.  And they look 
at it without us being able to participate in any kind of discussion.  And you get 
one shot.  And then the judges rule on whether or not the amended claims come 
into effect. 
So, shockingly, this is only less than 10 percent of the time.  And I would 
argue that that number probably even overstates the case because most people 
aren’t foolish enough to even try like we have.  Alright?  So, again, it might look 
fast.  It might look efficient.  But it isn’t the way that the PTO is directed to.  
What is the Patent Office directed to? 
Well the Patent Office is directed to issuing valid patents.  That’s what it’s 
for.  Okay?  Lobbing briefs at each other, not having the collaborative, iterative 
process of moving towards the outcome that we’re really looking for is not the 
way to run the circus.  And, unfortunately, that’s currently the way it’s 
organized. 
So, again, STRONGER Patents Act has, I believe they call it an off ramp, 
where you actually get to sit down with somebody, have a real conversation, 
640 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:607 
work through the issues and see if you can get a patent fixed if it’s defective.  I 
don’t think anybody that is a patent owner would legitimately object to trying to 
fix something if there is actually a problem with it. 
So let’s talk about the third issue.  Kim’s organization, the LES, has started a 
standards process in which our company is very much involved.  And we are 
very excited about the opportunity to hold ourselves out as a reasonable, 
responsible, legitimate business.  Because, historically, there have been abusive 
behaviors for all kinds of reasons.  On one side of the table, you’ve got the folks 
that were mimeographing demand letters and sending them to mom and pop 
coffee shops and saying, “Pay me $25,000 or I’m going to sue you for offering 
Wi-Fi to your customers.”  That’s abusive behavior. 
The flip side is if you’re a big company, or a small company, and you read 
Colleen Chien’s article in the Wall Street Journal telling you that if you get a 
demand letter, the thing to do is just ignore it and you ignore it.  I would say that 
is abusive behavior.  What we do is we put together a package that the postman 
can barely carry—it’s so big with all the history of our patents and explaining 
how it works and explaining why it reads on a particular technology that 
somebody owns and we ask to sit down and have a conversation.  And instead 
it’s ignored. 
So what I like about the last piece of the STRONGER Patents Act is that it 
deals with abusive behavior.  By all means, deal with deceptive demand letters.  
By all means.  But what I’d like to see is that judges, whether they’re 
administrative judges at the PTAB or Article III judges in district courts, the 
very first question that somebody is asked when they come to one of the tribunals 
to deal with a patent issue is “did you two sit down and try to work this out using 
the standards that LES has adopted as best practices?”  And if the answer is “no, 
we haven’t talked to each other.  We just rushed to the court house because that 
seemed like the right thing to do.”  “Get out of my courtroom.  If efficiency is 
really what this is all about, then good.  Get out of my courtroom and you all go 
work it out using the best practices that LES, representing a wide range of 
industries and participants, has defined as best practices.  Sit down and be 
reasonable with each other.” 
And that kind of activity could work.  So let’s get away from patent trolls or 
efficient infringers, good patents, bad patents.  Let’s talk about abusive behavior.  
And let’s make sure that whether it’s regulatory or legislative action, it addresses 
abusive behavior.  Because there’s nothing wrong with the business model of 
owning a patent and licensing it.  Nor is there anything wrong with using a 
patent.  But people on both sides can find ways to be abusive.  And that’s really 
what really needs to be stamped out. 
MS. SELF: So I would like to speak to the international implications of the 
changes that we have been making to our patent system over the past 10 to 15 
years.  Just to give you a little of context, Qualcomm is today the global leader 
in the foundational cellular technologies that have driven the evolution of 2G, 
3G, 4G and now on the cusp of 5G.  And so if you think about the changes in 
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terms of what you can do with the device in your hand or in your pocket, the 
incredible transformation of your phone as a powerful computer in your pocket 
that has seamless connectivity, incredible data capacity, incredible data rates.  
All of that has been driven by huge investments in the R&D that drives 
improvements to cellular technology.  It’s an incredibly R&D-intensive 
technology space.  Increasingly only a handful of companies are really making 
big investments in this space.  Of course, the ecosystem that’s enabled by these 
technologies is huge and we can only imagine what business models will emerge 
under a 5G cellular foundation.  If you think about a business model like Uber 
that was enabled by 4G, Uber could not have existed in a 3G world. 
So we are really on the cusp of a transformational change in cellular 
communications that will drive enormous productivity, competitiveness, job 
growth, advances in mobile health; really every aspect of our lives will be 
impacted by 5G as everything becomes connected to everything. 
Each generation of cellular technology takes about 10 years of R&D, billions 
of dollars in investments, which take place well before any kind of 
commercialization.  And to the point that Director Kappos was making about 
standardization, standardization is the proving ground.  It is the convergence of 
the best engineers in the world to determine which companies will lead in 5G.  
Qualcomm, historically—because of our incredible commitment to the cellular 
space and R&D—we have led over time and we are confident that we can lead 
in 5G, but only if our patent system is strong enough to justify those huge 
investments in R&D.  And the revenue engine for making those investments is 
our patent licensing model.  And it has been since the founding of the company 
30 years ago. 
If you think about the implications of this gradual erosion of our patent 
system, over the past 10 years we have seen this sort of, not only just the changes 
in policies that undermined certainty around subject matter eligibility or validity.  
There is a fundamental erosion in the confidence of our patent system in the 
ability to enforce your patent rights, not only in terms of surviving a PTAB 
challenge, but in terms of getting a user of your technology to the bargaining 
table.  And we hear that a lot from smaller inventors.  But even a company the 
size of Qualcomm, which has over 100,000 pending and issues patents, we still 
are feeling the brunt of that uncertainty in the United States and worldwide. 
And I also want to speak to how this erosion of our patent system bleeds into 
other sectors and has fueled, in our case, really an attack on the company’s patent 
licensing model in particular through antitrust actions in Asia, where we saw this 
kind of growing skepticism of patent licensing business models originating in 
Congress, bleeding into our antitrust authorities, resulting in statements, 
speeches, policies that really cast a kind of harsh light of skepticism on licensing 
models, which were in turn leveraged by foreign antitrust authorities to justify 
what were essentially technology grabs using the language of antitrust to justify 
essentially compulsory licensing. 
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It started in China and moved to Korea to Taiwan—and if you think about the 
concerns that we’re hearing through the trade disputes over compelled 
technology transfer—just think for a moment the power these antitrust 
authorities have to essentially dictate pricing of U.S. technology in some cases 
with an explicit statutory right to use antitrust to protect domestic champions, 
national champions.  It becomes an incredibly lethal tool against U.S. technology 
leaders.  And in our space, again, it’s an increasingly small number of companies 
that are making these huge investments, with Asian companies quickly on our 
heels looking to leapfrog our leadership.  And that becomes all the more possible 
when patent rights are suddenly subject to intense antitrust scrutiny, which 
becomes essentially a price regulation tool. 
MR. CICARELLA: Unfortunately, David stole my thunder and told the 
Cleveland Clinic story earlier today, so I really don’t have anything else to add.  
No.  I’m kidding obviously. 
I think it’s great that David mentioned the Cleveland Clinic story about our 
NPO patents that were invalidated because it was an unscripted ad hoc mention.  
I think it really underscores the issue.  On a micro level, we think it was an awful 
outcome that these really groundbreaking detection and diagnostic medical tools 
were ultimately deemed not patent eligible.  And on a macro level, the idea that 
we’re sort of facing a crisis of innovation in the life science and medical 
diagnostic field because of the inconsistent application of 101 and the Federal 
Circuit’s expansive and expanding interpretation of Mayo. 
And Bryce, in his description of University of Michigan’s team—very similar 
to what Cleveland Clinic Innovations does, so I don’t need to describe what 
Cleveland Clinic Innovations does now—he stole my thunder on that.  Except I 
will add: instead of tech transfer, we like to use technology commercialization 
because really the goal is not just cultivating ideas for new inventions and then 
funding the research that’s necessary to validate those inventions, but ultimately 
commercialize those inventions and create products and services that are going 
to improve patient care and treatment outcomes.  That’s really what our mission 
is.  It’s not just getting something on the market and make money.  That’s great 
because our CFO would say, “If there’s no margin, there’s no mission.”  We 
reinvest our commercialization proceeds into that early-stage development 
that’s necessary to actually sort of validate something before institutional 
investors are really interested. 
I will add a few more things about the NPO patent story.  So, again, these 
groundbreaking detection and diagnostic tools that were disclosed in the patents 
were the result of years of research, millions of dollars, and intense scrutiny by 
the PTO.  I think it took over a decade before the patents actually issued. 
In one case, the claims were rejected on Section 101, 102, and 103 grounds.  
One patent went through two reexaminations.  So these really were intensely 
scrutinized by the PTO and, ultimately, some investors funded the development 
of a clinical NPO test that could be offered for sale.  And that was the company 
that was ultimately sold.  We thought somebody was infringing, so we filed a 
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temporary restraining order.  They responded with a motion to dismiss that was 
granted.  So at the pleading stage, these patents that went through a decade of 
review by the PTO, intensely scrutinized, were invalidated at the pleading stage.  
So there was no claim construction.  There was no expert witness testimony.  
They paid lip service to the idea that they reviewed the prosecution history, 
which they couldn’t have done because that involved realms of data and so they 
absolutely did not do that. 
And so, where are we now?  Well, Cleveland Heart Lab is still selling the 
NPO test kit, but so are other people.  So Cleveland Heart Lab, unfortunately, is 
not making as much money as they were because now you’ve got people who 
are cutting into their market share.  The Cleveland Clinic isn’t making any 
money now off of the NPO test kits, right?  Because the claims were invalidated, 
so there’s no royalty income, right?  That’s how we profit off of the 
commercialization of these inventions. 
So, again—no margin, no mission—because we’re not receiving the 
commercialization of royalty income.  We can’t reinvest that into the early stage 
research and development of these life-saving innovations.  And the inventor—
this was his life’s work, right?  He’s not rewarded because it’s actually the 
Cleveland Clinic IP; under our IP distribution policy, the inventors actually share 
in the proceeds of the commercialization that we receive.  So we’re not receiving 
anything.  So he’s not receiving anything.  But in the meantime, people are 
making millions of dollars off of the NPO test kits. 
So that’s sort of the micro result of this.  But, again, on a macro level, we 
really are facing a crisis of innovation in the life science and medical diagnostic 
field because of this inconsistent application of 101.  And even if we do get 
patents issued, you can get them invalidated.  It’s just having a really chilling 
effect on the inventors and the investors.  Investors are risk averse and there’s 
just so much uncertainty around 101 that life sciences and medical diagnostic 
technologies are really not high on their priority list until you can give them 
some assurance that they’re absolutely going to get some return. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Thank you, Jeff.  I appreciate it.  Obviously, I’m sure 
everybody in the room has a war story that they could share, myself included, 
but after the panel, we’ll have an opportunity if you’d like to talk to them at 
length on some of those more details.  But, what I wanted to do was—actually 
similar to the last panel—if you could state one thing to Congress or the USPTO, 
what is it that you would like to be able to say to them directly today?  Want to 
start off, Manny?  Jeff? 
MR. CICARELLA: So our NPO patent story is actually incomplete because 
we strongly disagree with the outcome and we’ve filed a cert petition to the 
Supreme Court that’s currently pending.  So hopefully the Supreme Court takes 
the bait and reigns in this expansive interpretation of Mayo.  But we’re obviously 
not optimistic that’s going to happen. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Okay.  Thank you. 
MR. CICARELLA: So if we can I think—stronger patents. 
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MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Excellent.  Laurie. 
MS. SELF: I would say to restore the property rights foundation of patents 
and the right to injunctive relief.  If you think about the role of an injunction in 
terms of incentivizing users of patented technology to come to the negotiating 
table as opposed to stealing the technology and potentially paying damages five, 
ten years down the road, at the end of litigation, it is an incredibly important tool 
in terms of ensuring that our patent system functions as intended and becomes 
an incentive to invest in R&D and to achieve a fair return on that investment.  
And, unfortunately, in the United States it has become incredibly difficult for 
companies to obtain injunctive relief, even for large companies.  And we now 
are in a strange dynamic where it’s easier to get an injunction in China than it is 
in the United States. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Thank you. 
MR. EISENSTEIN: I would say it’s time particularly for the legislature to 
look at the patent regime in the United States and recognize that that is just is 
much a competitive positioning statement as the regulatory regime for our 
capital markets, as it is for our democratic process, our election process, as it is 
for currency, trade policy.  It’s right up—I know patent stuff is boring.  I get it.  
But it’s just as important on the global stage.  And passing the STRONGER 
Patents Act would be a huge step towards saying that we are going to compete 
on a level playing field with our global competitors. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Bryce. 
MR. PILZ: I like the idea I heard in the first panel about the legislative revision 
to 101 to do away with the exceptions to create clarity.  I think we can all deal 
with figuring out 102, 103.  There’s sufficient foreseeability and predictability 
under those regimes.  But 101, right now, is the significant problem at the early 
stage. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: And Manny? 
MR. SCHECTER: So I agree.  Legislation is going to be where it’s at here.  
The uncertainty that’s been created with respect to Section 101 at the USPTO 
and the lower courts—that’s not the fault of any of the fine people in those 
organizations and they’re not going to be able to fix it.  We’ve seen some steps 
already that the new director has taken with respect to a Federal Register notice 
on having examiners document what it means for something to be conventional 
or routine.  All good.  But at the end of the day, I was taught that when you get 
a disease, you want to cure the disease, not cure the symptoms.  The disease is 
the test—the judicial exceptions and the test that is supposed to be able to 
identify them.  But they can’t.  We need to legislate them away, or at least bring 
some certainty to the test. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Very good.  Thank you very much.  We do have a few 
minutes—maybe two—if somebody has a question. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: So we’ve got two really good big companies 
here representing the forces of goodness, in my humble opinion.  So what can 
be done because the legislature is affected by lobbyists and contributions and 
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things like that?  And you guys know who I’m talking about when I’m talking 
about the forces of evil.  I don’t need to name any names.  What can be done, 
practically, because you’re confrères in certain respects?  What can be done to 
bring those companies in line for legislation?  And how would you amend 101 
to avoid the problem? 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Why don’t we have—does one person want to take that 
from the panel?  I think we’re running out of time. 
MR. SCHECTER: Well, the first thing I’d say for some of those companies 
that you’re calling the forces of evil—when they have a crisis and they realize 
that they’ve been ripped off, some of them will get religion in this area.  But the 
other thing that I think that needs to happen is—I think Dave Kappos mentioned 
this morning, earlier—the need for a public dialog, the need to start raising 
awareness.  And that’s absolutely true.  And that needs to start, I think, with a 
dialogue that occurs between the associations that have been backing legislation, 
Congress, and the new Director to all start talking about what needs to be done.  
If we get enough consensus, and enough momentum, we can do this. 
MS. CHOTKOWSKI: Well, thank you very much.  I know we’re out of time.  




FIRESIDE CHAT WITH IP AND INNOVATION POLICY LEADERS 
 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: I think we’re honored to be joined today by the 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and the Director of the 
USPTO, Andrei Iancu.  Mr. Iancu, I think, as most folks know, he’s been in the 
job—what?  About six? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Three months. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Three whole months. 
DIRECTOR IANCU: The anniversary was yesterday. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: He’s gone from a— 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Anniversary was yesterday.  But there was no party.  It 
was— 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Well, you put out a rule, right?  Or that was a 
good birthday present.  I think most folks also have noticed that things are 
starting to really happen there at the PTO.  Just a little background: Director 
Iancu came to us as the managing partner at one the most important litigation 
firms in this country, Irell & Manella, where you spent your entire career I think. 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Most of it.  For a couple of years, I was at Lyon & Lyon. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: And we welcome you back here to the east, to the 
swamp since you’ve moved.  And is a graduate of UCLA, both I think 
undergraduate and law school.  Aeronautical engineering, did it get that right?  
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What we’re going to do this afternoon is we’re going to have just a brief 
introduction.  Andrei has a few remarks he wants to make.  And then I’ve got a 
couple questions you’ve sent in, and a couple questions that I have and, 
hopefully, we’ll use up all the time doing that. 
Just to sort of set it up a little bit, we have a recent quote at a recent speech 
you gave, if I can find it, that I think set a few years to set up what appears to be 
your initial tenure.  “For too long, the words surrounding our patent system have 
been overly focused on its faults.  A successful system cannot be defined by its 
faults.  Rather a successful system must be defined by its goals, its aspirations, 
and its successes.” 
I think many people would notice you’re off to a quick start in a number of 
these things, and I think, philosophically, I’m assuming this derives from that as 
well.  So why don’t you tell us a little bit about your goals and aspirations and 
where we’re going. 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Great.  Thanks, Todd.  I’m going to stand up so I can 
see you all better.  I will address that exact point, but let me begin a little bit 
elsewhere. 
First of all, thanks for inviting me.  Thanks for all of you to be here—a very 
distinguished crowd,: former judges, the Senator is going to come, and 
Congressman, former Directors.  It’s humbling. 
One of the things that makes our profession so great, one of the tremendously 
exciting parts of why we all do what we do is the inventors we interact with, the 
inventions they make, and the excitement of all that.  Right?  So on a daily basis, 
in different respects, we encounter these folks who I believe are the individually 
little engines of our economy.  And we interact with them, we encounter them 
alive, and we encounter historical figures.  So for today let me talk about a 
historical figure: an inventor who did most of his inventive work in the second 
part of the 1800s. 
So in 1870–1871 or so, this particular inventor got completely tired of the 
suspenders he had to wear.  So he invented removable and adjustable suspenders 
for different types of garments.  He got a patent on that in 1871.  He didn’t make 
much money with that.  But then he invented a self-adhesive scrap book.  Got a 
patent on that.  I actually don’t really know how you open up a self-adhesive 
scrap book, but that probably was the genius of the invention.  He actually made 
significant money on that. 
On a going forward basis, he actually had some other patents and he ultimately 
became one of the most famous Americans ever.  With that in mind, Mr. 
Dickinson, who am I talking about? 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Oh, God. 
DIRECTOR IANCU: “Oh, God” was his answer.  The other former director?  
No idea.  The judges?  No idea.  Wow.  Sorry? 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Edison. 
2018] Meeting the Challenges to America's Economic Future 647 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Edison with suspenders?  He did wear pants, yes.  I’m 
speaking about Samuel Clements.  Actually Mark Twain had patents and he did 
make significant money from that, actually, from the scrap book.  Comparable, 
in fact, with the money he made from his books.  Ultimately, later on, he wrote 
a book, as you all know, Connecticut Yankee at King Arthur’s Court.  His main 
character achieves power, as you probably know.  And the first thing he does 
when he takes office is he establishes a Patent Office.  And he says—he 
emphasizes—that a country without a Patent Office and good patent laws is like 
a crab.  It can only move backwards or sideways.  And then he goes on to 
emphasize not only that he established a Patent Office, and not only that it was 
the first thing he did, it was on the first day he took office. 
And, in fact, if you look at American history, it is the same story with our 
founders.  They establish the country and James Madison, in the first Congress—
one of the first acts was the Patent Act of 1790.  And the first patent issued very 
quickly thereafter in July of 1790, signed by George Washington. 
They recognized the same thing.  And to candidly assess what has happened 
ever since is that the results not only have been remarkable for the United States 
and the world.  I am absolutely certain they were completely unpredicted—the 
extent of its success—to the founders themselves. 
In just a few weeks or months, we’re going to issue patent number 10,000,000.  
You’re all going to see it.  And it’s a remarkable achievement.  And it’s not just 
numbers.  It’s not just 10,000,000, it could be any number.  But it’s not just that.  
Think about the actual accomplishments with those 10,000,000 patents.  When 
Mark Twain wrote his books and invented suspenders, they were riding around 
this town still on horses.  We’re talking just 150 years ago.  Flight was but an 
absolute dream on imagination.  Medicine, surgery were just as primitive as 
ever.  And that’s only 150 years ago. 
Put that in the context of human history.  Humans have been on this planet for 
tens of thousands of years at least.  It depends how you count the beginning.  
Modern civilizations have been around for thousands of years.  The Egyptians, 
the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Aztecs, the Mayans—you can go on.  And yet it’s 
only within the context of this country and its Constitution and our patent system 
that these remarkable technological and scientific advances have been made in 
the past couple hundred years.  Put that in context. 
Now, is it all the patent system?  I’m sure there are a whole lot of issues that 
have created this environment, but I would not take my chances without it.  So 
we, as leaders, have a responsibility to take care of it—of the patent system, that 
is.  To nurture it, to guide it, to make sure that it stays on a straight balance path 
that it has been meant to be.  And to make sure that the environment we have for 
it is for the future, enabling the same kind of progress that has been made that 
will continue on our watch and on our children’s watch. 
So to the question of what our responsibility is that if we like the patent 
system, we certainly must fix its errors, but we must principally advocate for 
advance and praise its many, many, many, many successes.  And I caution folks 
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that criticism, relentless criticism on one side, is just as damaging to the patent 
system as relentless criticism on the other side.  In order for the system to be 
successful, the community needs to have confidence in the system and relentless 
criticism of the system from any side reduces the industry’s confidence in the 
system.  We can accomplish the same things in the same goals by focusing on 
the inventor’s successes and on the amazing benefits of their inventions. 
So in everything we discuss, I caution balance and an even-keeled approach.  
Madison, in Federalist 43,137 said that the constitutional power granted to 
Congress to establish the patent system will hardly or scarcely be questioned.  
“Why?” he went on to say.  Because the public interest is equal to the 
expectations and the claims of the individual.  From the get-go, the founders 
believed that there needs to be a balance in the system inherently for the system 
to work.  It needs to be balanced on many, many different planes, but in 
Madison’s view, as between the owners and the public, and that is certainly the 
case. 
Let me leave you with this and then we’ll go to your questions.  In that 
balance, we must have our hand firmly grasping the rudder and course correct, 
of course, is needed in a steady way.  And with that, if we do that, then we will 
ensure that our country is not a crab, that we will only be moving forward. 
And I was going to get into my remarks about what we are doing nowadays 
at the PTO, but I expect you will have questions on that.  So I will stop there.  
Thanks, all, for listening. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Let me take off on that point for a second.  I think 
those are great remarks and I think extremely appropriate and I think that they’ve 
been applauded in most courts as a matter of fact because they’re exactly right.  
But, Washington and the public policy agreement, generally, has been pretty 
partisan, pretty at war with each other.  Now our partisanship is not necessarily 
political partisanship, but we have our own partisanship.  How do you see 
yourself drawing these sides together—the people with different views on 
things—particularly when you’ve actively said you’re taking a hard look at 
things like PTAB rules and how they operate over there and what about 101 and 
that sort of thing?  How do you bring the parties together? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Well, look, I think it is important for myself and PTO 
leadership to meet with as many stakeholders and stakeholder groups as 
possible.  And we’ve had an open door for them.  And we want to hear them out.  
And we actively engage them.  For those of you who have come to our offices 
in the past three months, you will know that we are not a laidback panel just 
listening to you.  We are actively engaging with you and we want to hear you.  
And we, from all aspects, really do take everything that’s being said to us in 
those discussions into account. 
My own background—I have practiced in all sorts of—as a practicing 
lawyer—all sorts of industries, plaintiff-side, defendant-side, different courts.  
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So I really do understand the various points of view and the answer is not always 
on one side.  And I think certain things will go one way.  Different things will 
go a different way and we’ll take them one issue at a time. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Do you see your role then as being proactive in 
this regard?  I think it seems to be so far.  The question came up in an earlier 
panel.  For example, a number of the reforms that are being talked about at the 
PTAB—let’s take one example—are things that might be able to be done 
administratively or through rule-making, which is within your ken as opposed 
to coming to Congress.  Some not.  Do you have a view on that? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Why did you mention PTAB?  Is that being discussed 
in this conference?  I don’t know. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: No comment. 
DIRECTOR IANCU: So, yes.  Well, certainly, at least as far as the PTAB is 
concerned, there is significant discretion built into the statute to the PTO to 
implement the appropriate rules, regulations, approaches to its AIA actions.  And 
there is certainly quite a bit that has been and will continue to be done from the 
PTO itself.  Obviously, you have seen the notice for the claim construction 
standard that was published today that is within the PTO’s discretion.  That’s 
something that can be done from the PTO. 
There are a handful of things that cannot be done from the PTO.  For example, 
the standards of proof, which was legislatively inserted into the statute and that’s 
the law under which we operate.  But when it comes to AIA proceedings, the 
statute did give the PTO significant discretion. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: The Supreme Court just came down with a couple 
of cases and, I’m not going to ask you the specifics of the cases, but one justice 
in dissent and then in the majority in back-to-back cases, made a rather strong 
point about the independence of the judiciary—the Article 3 Judiciary—and the 
fact that agencies of the federal government are heavily influenced by politics 
and political processes, and that they have all this discretion and that all it takes 
is a change in administration for the heavy pressure to come to bear by lobbyists 
that are probably sitting here in the room.  I was a little taken aback by that as 
someone who had your job and I remember pressure, but I don’t remember 
politics coming into it too much.  Do you think it’s a fair comment?  Do you 
think it’s accurate?  Just part of the Chevron deference shtick? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Well, they are Supreme Court justices and they have a 
right to say what they believe.  I’ll tell you that I think that there is significant, 
in many respects, different statutory authority granted to the PTO and I’m certain 
you and Dave and everybody who came before me—Michel, Lee—we take our 
jobs very, very seriously and whatever we do, we do it very carefully.  And I I’m 
sure you will attest, things are being thought out thoroughly. 
So I, personally, don’t feel political pressure.  I understand that there are 
different points of view from different members of the industry.  And we listen 
to them carefully.  But I wouldn’t say that that’s the same as, you know, political 
pressure in the normal sense. 
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DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Let me ask a sort of mildly technical question 
someone has posed: Is the gap between prior art that’s discovered before a patent 
is granted, and that is then uncovered later—presumably in a post-grant or in a 
litigation—is the fact that, I guess, you don’t discover it early—is that a technical 
problem or a process problem? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Well, it is a problem. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: You’ve only been here how long? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: It is a problem that can be addressed both technically 
and with process.  There are things that we do with process at the PTO that can 
help in that regard: a different way to staff some matters, different ways to search 
and so forth.  And, in addition, it’s a problem that can be addressed with 
technology.  It’s a problem that can be addressed with technology that we have 
currently and we can implement currently and some steps are going in that 
direction already.  And it can be addressed with new technology, perhaps 
artificial intelligence that yet needs to be developed, although it’s foreseeable. 
So it is an issue that we are addressing and we are working to address in a 
whole host of ways. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Okay.  Another thing that sort of came out of the 
opinions was at least the Court’s recognition that they’re one big happy agency 
and they regarded you as an agency with the PTAB and the examiners and 
everybody.  Someone pointed out though that sometimes examiners examine to 
one standard.  I would say this most recent memorandum on 101 you put out.  
And the PTAB may not follow that and may operate on a different standard.  
Shouldn’t the agency all just have one standard that applies across the board or 
is there a reason for differentiation? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: Well, it depends on the exact issue.  There might be 
times where you need to differentiate.  But, overall, just at the very high level, it 
is one agency.  And one thing that is already beginning to happen is that there is 
crosspollination from the PTAB to the core and from the core to the PTAB.  So 
when the PTAB issues decisions, both in ex parte and inter partes proceedings, 
we want to make sure that the relevant decisions are filtered to the core and it 
becomes part of the training and the judges can go and train the examiners and 
so forth.  And vice versa.  The examiners have a lot of experience with what they 
see in the examination and what’s needed for a proper examination.  We want 
to make sure that the judges understand what examination is all about.  So 
working together is critically important. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Maybe we’re winding it up, I guess.  One more 
question.  Like a good moderator, I’ll toss up a softball for the ending if you 
don’t mind.  You’re talking a lot of reforms.  I think people are hoping for even 
more reforms coming down the pike.  The question is how can folks in here who 
believe in those reforms—what can they do to help you out? 
DIRECTOR IANCU: First of all, I don’t consider any of your prior questions 
not to have been softballs.  I’m just saying. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Ouch.  Then I have one more question then. 
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DIRECTOR IANCU: But they have all been very good questions.  Thank you. 
Look, I just think, as I said in my opening remarks, that all of us as leaders 
have a joint interest and joint responsibility to go out and advocate for the 
innovation ecosystem, to advocate for the intellectual property system, to make 
the world learn, understand, remember how important it is what we all do, what 
our clients do, and the incredible advances this entire ecosystem is responsible 
for historically, culturally, and economically.  And I think if we all do that 
together in an even, balanced way, without overhyping one side or overhyping 
another side, I think overall we will see great benefits from this incredible patent 
system that we have been so blessed to inherit.  Thank you. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: I hope you will join me in thanking the Director 
for his comments and his candor. 
MR. ARONOFF: That was excellent.  Thank you very much.  As the Director 
departs, we’re bringing up Senator Coons.  We are privileged to have the Senator 
join us.  Todd will take it from here.  The Congressman will be here as soon as 
he can. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Good to see you, Senator. 
SENATOR COONS: Thank you.  I frankly think you’ve covered it all. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Let me also extend a warm welcome on behalf of 
the conference as well to Senator Coons.  By way of introduction, Senator Coons 
is a Senator from Delaware, my ancestral home.  He was just recently reelected 
in the last 2014 election.  He’s, among other things, the former Council 
Executive for the New County Council, which includes Wilmington, I guess?  
Yes.  And was also, I think, Deputy General Counsel for Al Gore.  So he 
understands a lot, I think, of the stresses and the strains on big business, 
understands the patent system from that perspective, which I think is very 
valuable.  He sits on the Judiciary Committee, the Appropriations Committee, 
the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Ethics Committee, and Small 
Business.  How do you get anything done?  That’s a lot of committee work. 
But I think one of the things you’re most passionate about and have shown 
that is IP policy and how it relates to economic development and jobs, frankly, 
in this country.  He went to Amherst and Harvard Law, I believe.  And as most 
folks know, this Congress introduced what’s now called the STRONGER 
Patents Act, which would make a number of particularly good amendments, or 
particular amendments to the PTAB process as well as a few other processes 
concerning the patent application process in how it’s managed and also things 
like the alleged troll problem and that sort of thing. 
So why don’t I first just start off by asking you why are you interested in this 
and how do you see this all?  We sometimes pay lip service to the idea that 
intellectual property and innovation policy are important to economic 
development.  How do you see it in reality? 
SENATOR COONS: At the company for which I worked for eight years and 
which I’ve known or been associated with for decades, the company would not 
have survived but for patent protection.  Like many other innovators, it 
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developed a new product that really challenged existing, settled industrial 
interests and was infringed regularly in a variety of different applications from 
medical devices to outerwear.  And so one of the things I heard over and over 
and over while I was there was that 90 percent of the value of the company was 
its intellectual property and that that intellectual property was always at risk and 
was only as good as the last case.  We probably lost as many cases as we won, 
but because it was a material science company, patent litigation was a regular 
part of the business at all levels.  It was not some obscure issue area of interest 
only to attorneys or to the C-Suite.  It was something that everybody got training 
in and was engaged in.  And IP of all types, not just patents.  But trade secrets 
were also a regular concern as well as trademarks. 
That’s just one little keyhole through which I see the world and one of the 
things I try to do as a senator is make sure that I don’t over-privilege my own 
experience.  And so I set about visiting a lot of other companies in my 
community and Delaware, large and small.  But, I happen to come from a place 
where chemistry has been dominant for a long time and where patents and patent 
protection for innovation played a pretty big role.  My Boy Scout troop master 
has nine patents.  My high school chemistry teacher had 26 patents.  My brother-
in-law has four patents, and my step-father has more than 40 patents.  So I grew 
up around people who, I think, justifiably bragged about being patent holders.  
There is, by the way, in the Senate, a senator who I am friends with whose father 
and grandfather have patents, who were not engineers or researchers.  They were 
mechanics in the most common sense of the term.  And that’s Senator Merkley.  
And I keep trying to get him on this bill. 
Before Congressman Stivers comes and before I get hauled out—forgive 
me—let me just say at the highest level how grateful I am to all of you and, in 
particular, to PTO Director Iancu for understanding and grasping the power and 
the significance of intellectual property.  The Delaware District Court just 
happens, both through geography and recent decisional law by the Supreme 
Court. to now be the busiest patent district court in America.  And I take 
seriously my obligation to try and make sure that we have highly-qualified, 
relevantly-skilled, dederal district court judges, and that we have a supportive 
community of the bench and bar.  I have been a member of the Delaware Bar 
since 1992. 
I have a sense of the impact of intellectual property from my own family, from 
my immediate community, from my broader state, from my work experience, 
and from my legal environment.  So I’m not sure why this matters to me, but I 
think that’s probably enough to get us started. 
One of the real challenges I have found is engaging with folks who genuinely 
disagree, who have completely opposite views of patents.  And it was when I 
was running in 2010, I was in San Francisco at an event where a guy just sort of 
came up to me and said “I think patents are a bunch of crap.”  Why he thought I 
was the right candidate to accost with that, I don’t know.  But he sent me a whole 
book.  I think it was entitled Patents are a Bunch of Crap.  And he was someone 
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who had made a significant fortune in technology that is a component part of 
cell phones and his whole technology frame of reference and his whole 
background was in an area of very rapid iterative innovation, where propagation 
of a new invention was almost immediate and global because it was purely 
electronic and where the expected lifetime of any new disruptive invention was 
18 months or two years at most. 
And it took me a couple of years to process how different that is from growing 
up in a community where Kevlar and Teflon are sort of the iconic inventions, 
which take years to be displaced or challenged, which cost billions of dollars to 
scale up and manufacture, and which to propagate across the world as a new 
product takes years or decades and a global sales force. 
So anyway, I have a view about where a competitive perspective on 
intellectual property comes from, from different industrial sectors that are no 
less important to our competitiveness and no less to our robust economy.  But, 
as I have repeatedly argued with my friends on the other side in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, to tear up the entire patent litigation system, to benefit a 
small but very significant slice of our innovation, misses the role that patent 
protection has played since its creation in the Constitution and misunderstands 
where our greatest future benefits lie. 
So, thank you for a chance to be with you, and I see the good Congressman 
has joined us.  I was delayed a great long— 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I’m sorry I’m late. 
SENATOR COONS: Well, I was delayed a good 45 minutes, so, we’ll take a 
few quick questions jointly and then I’m going to have to go. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Well, the two big issues I think that we talked a 
lot about today that are on the table are, first of all, the STRONGER Patents Act, 
which you’ve both introduced now, and 101.  But let me start with the 
STRONGER Patents Act.  Well, maybe I should actually introduce 
Congressman Stivers first. 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: That’s all you got to say.  You just introduced 
me.  Great job. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Congressman Stivers represents Ohio’s 15th 
District, western Columbus and on out to the suburbs in some rural counties, so 
a lot of colleges and universities.  And “the” Ohio State University? 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: And Ohio University as well, Harvard on the 
Hocking. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Very good.  And you were just renominated last 
night.  So congratulations on that. 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: Yes, I was. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: You serve mostly on the Financial Services 
Committee, which is very interesting here because financial service and patents 
is a very interesting and kind of complicated issue.  So the fact that you’re 
situated and are interested in this issue I think is pretty fascinating. 
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CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I think it’s because of the fact that originally 
they couldn’t get anybody on the Judiciary Committee to sponsor it, but we’ve 
made a lot of progress on that. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Well, I’ll turn it over maybe to both of you to talk 
about the STRONGER Patents Act.  Tell us a little bit about it: why you were 
interested in it, what you think is important about it, what we can do to help you 
with, and that sort of thing. 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: So the STRONGER Patents Act, basically, 
stole a lot of the Senator’s great work and created a House companion to his 
Senate version of the Patents Bill that brings back property rights to patents, 
makes that absolutely clear, brings back injunctive relief, tries to fight bad 
patents by empowering folks at the FTC on demand letters and things like that.  
And it limits the number of back-to-back claims you can create.  By the way, the 
new Director of the Patent Office, just yesterday, instituted that part of the bill.  
Thank you.  So that’s a great start and it’s a great acknowledgement that we do 
need to do something.  So thanks for your work and that’s—I think that’s great 
and it’s a good acknowledgement that we’ve got some issues.  I’ll let the Senator 
talk a little more since it was originally his bill. 
SENATOR COONS: Thank you for covering the majority of its beneficial 
provisions.  Harmonization of standards between PTAB and district court is the 
only remaining one of significance.  This has been a labor of love over several 
Congresses now.  I am thrilled that we have a strong bipartisan team of 
cosponsors in the House.  And I think in a recent hearing in front of a committee 
in which I served in the Senate, Director Iancu had a whole lot of questions on 
a whole lot of topics about the Patent and Trademark Office, but I may have 
been the only one who raised the STRONGER Act, and a potential competing 
act wasn’t really raised at all. 
So—I’ll put it this way—the whole tone of the conversation around patents is 
completely different from two to three to four years ago.  The word “troll” wasn’t 
even used and I didn’t just use it now. 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: And one of the things about the change in tone 
that I think is really important as illustrated is that they had to go to a guy on 
Financial Services originally to sponsor this bill, but now the Judiciary 
Committee has acknowledged some of the issues.  When we passed the America 
Invents Act, it was sold as something that was going to make the patent system 
more efficient, cheaper, and faster.  Unfortunately, it’s done the opposite.  And, 
in the meantime, our system, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a 
pretty reliable and unbiased source, has said that our system dropped from 1st in 
the world to 10th in the world to, just a couple of months ago, now 12th in the 
world.  And so we’re still sliding a bit. 
I think that what Director Iancu has done is going to start to move us back in 
the right direction.  But there’s a piece I left out that is important: the 
harmonization with the courts will create a lot more certainty.  And speaking as 
somebody who was on the Financial Services Committee, when you create 
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certainty, you can better value cash flows and the property that is intellectual 
property.  And that’s why certainty is so important. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Let me ask maybe, I hope it’s not too tough, but 
we’re inside the inside of the beltway it says here.  I looked down the list of co-
sponsors.  It’s a nice list.  And I don’t think I saw anybody on the Judiciary 
Committee on the list, if I’m not mistaken.  How do you go about getting folks 
on that relevant committee enrolled in this process? 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: So we’ve been meeting with people on the 
Judiciary Committee.  Met with Chairman Bob Goodlatte, who has promised a 
hearing on the issue, not necessarily the Bill, but I’ll take that.  It’s time to have 
that conversation.  Just a few years ago, you couldn’t have even gotten anybody 
on sort of this side of patents as property rights to get an opportunity to have a 
hearing.  So, I’m excited about that. 
I’ve had great meetings with a couple folks who could be the next Chairman, 
as you know Chairman Goodlatte is term-limited.  Assuming that we hold 
control, I’ve met with a couple people who could be the next chair.  And 
assuming that we don’t keep control, I’ve met with some folks that could have 
serious senior positions on the Judiciary Committee.  Either way, we’re trying 
to work this in a bipartisan manner, trying to work with Republicans and 
Democrats.  It was introduced as a bipartisan bill with Foster from Illinois, who 
is working as hard on the Democrat side as I am on the Republican side.  And 
he is a rocket scientist, yes.  Patents and STRONGER Patents is not a partisan 
issue, as you can see up here. 
SENATOR COONS: It’s really not.  My next door neighbor in the hallway in 
Russell, but my extreme opposite in the ideological spectrum, Senator Tom 
Cotton, is my lead co-sponsor in the Senate.  And his passion for the Constitution 
and for property rights led him to an enthusiasm for it.  My life experience and 
the importance of patents and IP led me to it.  We come from different 
perspectives, but we share a deep concern about what had been sustained to 
undermine the strength of the patent litigation system. 
I’m happy to talk to you about hearings.  We had a hearing in the Judiciary 
Committee a couple years ago that was, I mean, wow.  As Durbin said at one 
point, the only witnesses that were allowed at this hearing today were those who 
hate the patent system and those who really hate the patent system.  And it was— 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: The whole spectrum. 
SENATOR COONS: —it was just wonderfully maddening.  We did have two 
really good hearings in Small Business that actually had, relatively speaking, 
representative groups. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: So that leads us to the question of prospects.  
Probably not this Congress, I’m assuming, with everything else it’s time to get 
reelected, right?  And there’s a lot of other things that have to go on, and we’re 
used to kind of long-term processes in the IP world.  Any sense of what that 
process looks like? 
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CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I always tell people who want to build a plan 
on a two-year planning horizon, like two to three years, it’s probably not going 
to happen this year.  It’s already the silly season.  If you didn’t know, we had 
our silly season in Ohio last night and it went okay for me.  But the primaries 
are here and soon enough the general election.  By then, we’ll have just a little 
time, a potential lame duck session, but not enough time to really move anything.  
That’s why we’re trying to build momentum.  We’re still in the momentum 
building stage right now and we’re meeting with people on the Judiciary 
Committee because last year, if you remember what happened in the House 
Judiciary Committee, the bills they were doing would have cut completely 
against exactly what we’re doing.  It would have gone the opposite direction of 
the way I’m going and we stopped that bill and now we’re trying to go back 
toward property rights and injunctive relief and some type of system that is 
giving people a system that they can count on between the PTAB and the district 
court. 
SENATOR COONS: In talking with members of Judiciary and other 
colleagues, in pushing back against a competing bill in previous Congresses, 
most of them I simply succeeded in persuading them this is a really complicated 
issue that doesn’t deeply interest them, and that has— 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: These are not the drones you’re looking for. 
SENATOR COONS: Exactly.  And that has highly motivated and incredibly 
angry people berating them about why they are or are not on my bill or the 
competing bill.  And, as is the case in most legislative fights like that, it was 
successful in fighting to a draw what seemed to otherwise be a juggernaut of 
forward movement.  Having fought to a draw by having a group of senators who 
go “this is really complicated and it makes people angry and I don’t want to take 
the time to learn it,” it is now difficult to poll them and say “not only should you 
be more interested in it, but you should actively legislate on it.” 
So I do think in the Senate Judiciary Committee we need to have new 
leadership on the committee for me to be optimistic that we’re going to get out 
of committee.  On the other hand, there was a bill regarding the Special Counsel 
that I would have told you when it got introduced it would never get a hearing.  
It would never get a markup.  And it got voted out of Committee last week 14-
7. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: You got the Trade Secrets Bill through in a 
manner of months, didn’t you? 
SENATOR COONS: Yep.  And in the bill that I have with Hatch, which is 
the Big Data for IP Act—I always get the name wrong—it is both extending the 
fee-setting authority for PTO and helping PTO have access to big data, machine 
learning, and AI.  I think it’s possible we could get that done before the end of 
this session, partly because of Hatch’s leadership, partly because it is 
noncontroversial. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: I promised I’d shift to the other topic in the room, 
101 patent eligibility, which has gotten so complicated and confusing.  The way 
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the Supreme Court’s played it out, you really wonder if they really are paying 
enough attention when they’re writing those particular opinions.  But I think the 
consensus has come around that where once we thought the courts might be able 
to straighten it out, that consensus seems to have gone away and the belief is 
now that that may require a legislative fix.  And you have addressed it before.  I 
don’t know if you’ve addressed it, Congressman, but I know that you said you 
want to see a consensus approach from the stakeholder community and I know 
that there is work going on there.  Is that the case?  And do you want to comment 
on 101 at all? 
SENATOR COONS: It’s a mess.  The Supreme Court jurisprudence here—
they haven’t just wandered into a cul-de-sac.  They’ve sort of wandered around 
the whole neighborhood and sort of left thread in between trees and tied people 
up and I don’t know how; maybe I’m just not that good of a lawyer.  I can’t tell 
you; I could not draw a straight line between their most important recent cases 
and so I don’t know how as an examiner you would apply this, so I think Section 
101 jurisprudence is in a real mess as a result. 
It will be difficult to legislate around this because it is a complex area that has 
competing interests.  But as there is greater and greater cohesion amongst 
AIPLA and the American Bar Association IP and IPO, I am optimistic that we 
can get to a legislative proposal.  We’ll see whether we can get it moved through.  
I’m always happy to take up and run things. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: There’s an old cliché that says if a bill gets 
introduced like this, that would look like it would overturn the Supreme Court 
opinion— 
SENATOR COONS: Yes. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: —the Supreme Court starts to take a look at it. 
SENATOR COONS: That’s correct.  The Supreme Court is not—although 
They do function in a sort of temple-looking, removed building.  It does have 
windows.  And they do take judicial notice as they say of what it is that we do.  
And so I don’t think it would be taken as a needlessly hostile act to craft a bill 
that would say this is the direction that makes sense to us, and they may well 
begin to move their jurisprudence even in advance of legislation. 
I don’t think just the mere filing of a bill moves them.  But in an area that has 
so widely been—I mean, almost uniformly—criticized as being incoherent, I 
think it really could have that effect. 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I haven’t been particularly active in this space, 
but a spider web of confusing Supreme Court decisions is a great motivator for 
legislators because to a hammer everything looks like a nail and to a legislator 
everything looks like a bill.  So we’re ready to go and I’m sure we will take a 
look at it.  But a consensus from the community would make it a lot easier.  I 
mean it would grease the skids in a meaningful way.  So I hope people work on 
that. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Maybe too inside, but the House just recently had 
a hearing in the Judiciary on whether they can extend the civil CBM process, the 
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Covered Business Method process, which had a sunset in eight years.  Other 
than the Chairman and the Chairman of the Subcommittee, both of whom are 
lame ducks at the moment, there didn’t seem to be a lot of enthusiasm for that 
happening, if reading the hearing correctly; although there were witnesses that 
would really like it to happen.  Do you have any sense from the inside of when 
you think that’s going to happen there?  Is there going to be an extension?  Any 
broadening or anything?  Or is it just going to let it die of its own accord? 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I don’t know that it will definitely die of its 
own accord, but for sure the leadership change in the Judiciary Committee with 
the Chairman moving on and with the Subcommittee Chairman—I think that 
was Darrell Issa—moving on, is going to impact the outcomes because they have 
very strong—Darrell, especially, has very strong feelings as many of you in this 
room know.  So I think that will change prospects a bit depending on who takes 
control of the House and who is the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee as to 
whether there is a chance to get that renewed or whether it’s going to sunset. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Senator, any appetite for that? 
SENATOR COONS: [Inaudible] 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Where’s my timekeeper?  Are we alright?  It’s 
2:00.  You guys ready to go?  Okay.  Keep going.  Well, they have other things 
that they have to move on to.  I haven’t gotten any more cards.  I’m getting five 
minutes, but I think the Senator, particularly, would like to get moving. 
SENATOR COONS: I’ll take a last question. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Do you think it’s ironic that the Trump 
Administration sent a large delegation, starting with the Secretary of Treasury, 
to China to try to lobby them hard on the trade issues of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement and yet in the United States thinks to be— it’s 
weakening if anything—maybe going the other direction?  Is that ironic or just— 
SENATOR COONS: You know, a certain enthusiasm for irony is called for 
in this line of work.  The ability to hold completely contradictory thoughts in 
one’s head at the same time is essential to the role of an elected official.  Look, 
I commend President Trump.  After years and years and years of meeting with 
different administrations, different ambassadors, both in the private sector and 
now as a senator, trying to raise the issues of IP theft and get it up here for the 
seriousness with which he’s taking the threat to the United States of IP theft by 
China and other countries, that’s admirable. 
I hope that it is carried out in a thoughtful and diligent way.  I am worried 
about some of the other trade actions that are going on and that they may not 
ultimately turn out well.  But I think we have been the victim of a massive 
generational theft of IP.  And so we need to get a line where we are strengthening 
our own domestic IP infrastructure, laws, regulations, and system and fighting 
for strong IP systems and rights and protections overseas at the same time.  And 
I actually think that’s possible. 
And then, irony of all ironies, this denizen of MSNBC would congratulate the 
Trump Administration. 
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CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: And I think the Senator brings up a good point.  
I was at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base not too far from my district about a 
year ago.  It’s something that Mike Turner was doing on defense policy and they 
showed an American fighter jet and a Chinese fighter jet and they looked eerily 
similar because they stole our intellectual property that is essentially a contractor 
holding government information as an agent of the government.  And they had 
stolen that intellectual property.  They steal a lot of private company’s 
intellectual property as well.  We need to take intellectual property theft 
seriously at home and abroad. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: Thank you very much.  I hope you’ll join me with 
a hand.  I forgot one interesting fact.  Are you a Brigadier General?  Is that 
correct?  Did I get that? 
CONGRESSMAN STIVERS: I am. 
DIRECTOR DICKINSON: A Brigadier General.  So that’s leadership.  Thank 
you very much, both of you, and to the audience. 
MR. ARONOFF: Alright.  Well, we want to thank everybody.  We’re actually 
going to do a quick wrap.  We’re going to do a quick wrap here. 
On behalf of the International IP Commercialization Council, we want to 
thank you for joining us today for this great session.  Thank you to the Senator, 
the Congressman, the Director of the PTO, to all of our panelists, all the 
companies, the former Directors of the PTO, former Federal Chief Judges and 
such.  Thank you to the audience also.  I want to thank our sponsors, not the least 
of which Catholic University for doing the transcriptions for us today.  And, 
specifically, I wanted to thank Professor Megan La Belle and Professor Beth 
Winston who are here in the audience.  Thank you so much for doing the 
transcriptions.  Thank you to all our moderators.  Thank you to our sponsors and 
we’ll be following up with more information in the future.  Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
